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Abstract 
Mobile phones are increasingly becoming tools for social interaction. As more phones come 
equipped with location tracking capabilities, capable of collecting and distributing personal 
information (including location) of their users, user control of location information and privacy for 
that matter, has become an important research issue. 
 
This research first explores various techniques of user control of location in location-based 
systems, and proposes the re-conceptualisation of deception (defined here as the deliberate 
withholding of location information) from information systems security to the field of location 
privacy.  Previous work in this area considers techniques such as anonymisation, encryption, 
cloaking and blurring, among others. Since mobile devices have become social tools, this thesis 
takes a different approach by empirically investigating first the likelihood of the use of the 
proposed technique (deception) in protecting location privacy. We present empirical results (based 
on an online study) that show that people are willing to deliberately withhold their location 
information to protect their location privacy. However, our study shows that people feel uneasy in 
engaging in this type of deception if they believe this will be detected by their intended recipients. 
The results also suggest that the technique is popular in situations where it is very difficult to detect 
that there has been a deliberate withholding of location information during a location disclosure. 
 
Our findings are then presented in the form of initial design guidelines for the design of deception 
to control location privacy. Based on these initial guidelines, we propose and build a deception-
based privacy control model. Two different evaluation approaches are employed in investigating 
the suitability of the model. These include; a field-based study of the techniques employed in the 
model and a laboratory-based usability study  of the Mobile Client application upon which the DPC 
model is based, using HCI (Human Computer Interaction) professionals.  
 
Finally, we present guidelines for the design of deception in location disclosure, and lessons 
learned from the two evaluation approaches. We also propose a unified privacy preference 
framework implemented on the application layer of the mobile platform as a future direction of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Throughout history, in a person’s daily interactions with his or her environment, location has been 
crucial to survival.  This is true of resources – knowing where the supermarket is, or where wild 
foodstuffs may be gathered.   It is true of dangers – knowing the location of a hazardous bridge or 
of a prowling predator.   
 
Location is equally important with respect to social interactions, not just in terms of resources and 
dangers, but also in terms of maintaining social relationships and meeting social responsibilities.  
Prompt, accurate knowledge of the location of an accident can enable emergency services to save 
lives.  Parents’ knowledge of their children’s whereabouts may enable them to assess their safety.  
The communication of location among people within social networks is a common interaction 
within the social discourse (Smith, 2005).   
 
In the last decade, there is no doubt that technology has played a useful role in improving the way 
location is communicated between people. A number of technologies (e.g. mobile phone 
conversations, text or instant messaging, and email) have facilitated the exchange of location 
information between people of the same social network (Smith, 2005). Studies conducted in 
Germany and England suggest that teenagers use text messaging to get connected with friends and 
loved ones, and to arrange meetings (Grinter and Eldridge 2001; Höflich and Rössler 2001; Smith, 
Consolvo et al. 2005), all of which depend on their physical locations. The underlying principle 
behind these technologies (i.e. the use of asynchronous communication) has been harnessed into 
the provision of location-based services (i.e. services that rely on the current location of their 
users), and in recent times social location disclosure applications - SLDA SLDAs usually rely on 
“the explicit sharing of location information in a social communication” (Smith, 2005).  With the 
use of GSM-based fingerprinting (Laitinen et al., 2001; Otsason et al., 2005) which improves 
location accuracy to about 43 metres (in urban areas), more location-based services have begun to 
emerge and are increasingly becoming popular (child location services, fleet management systems, 
friend finders, etc).  
 
The upsurge in the provision of location-based services by mobile phone operators in particular 
comes with benefits which have never been as promising as they are now. In 2005 revenue from 
  1.1. Introduction 
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location-based services in Europe was 274 million Euros. This figure is expected to reach 622 
million Euros by 2010 (Berg Insight, 2006).  
 
Much as these services provide social as well as financial benefits, one major setback threatens 
their use – the ability to control one’s location privacy. The lack of user control of location in 
location-based services such as the friend finder makes it difficult for users to manage their 
location disclosures effectively, other than a disclose/do not disclose setting. Since location can be 
sensitive personal information, disclosure can be a source of privacy risk. For instance, knowing 
that a teenage girl is located in a pregnancy crisis centre could potentially tell a lot about the 
person.  
 
In a recent survey of location-based service providers, more innovative location-based services to 
meet user needs was cited as one of three key factors that will further help boost the market for 
location-based services (Berg Insight, 2006). Though this was a marketing survey, and hence, less 
reliable than an academic survey, it is clear that addressing inherent problems in location-based 
services through innovative user control models is a market enabler and should be given 
considerable attention in the research environment. 
 
In this thesis I have therefore chosen to focus on privacy as a key issue to investigate. Previous 
studies indicate that users of location-based services generally control their location disclosure by 
anonymising (hiding the identity of the user); blurring (decreasing the accuracy of the location and 
possibly time; cloaking (making the user’s location invisible); encrypting or hashing (disguising or 
obscuring the identity or location of the user); or lying or benign deception (giving intentionally 
false information about location or time). A substantial amount of work has already been carried 
out in anonymising (Beresford & Stajano, 2003; Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003); blurring (Duckham 
& Kulik, 2005; Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003); cloaking (Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003; Hong & 
Landay, 2004); and encryption (Beresford & Stajano, 2003; Jorns & Bessler, 2004). Most of these 
mechanisms are more suited for person-to-organisation interactions rather than peer-to-peer 
asynchronous setups where users request for their friends’ locations through their mobile devices 
instead of making a request from a web-based interface. I focus my research on deception as a 
location privacy protection mechanism because I find deception as an interesting social 
phenomenon. Besides, research in deception during location disclosure is just beginning to attract 
some attention among researchers in pervasive computing (Benford et al., 2004; Iachello et al., 
2005), though no work has yet been done on the use of deception in particular, as a design 
technique to protect location privacy.  
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1.2 Research Problem  
 
As stated above, though a substantial amount of work has been carried out in the use of deception 
in other disciplines, very little research has been done in location–based systems. There is already 
ample empirical evidence that deception (or put loosely, the disclosure of an untrue location during 
social interactions) is popular between people who communicate asynchronously. However, one of 
the pitfalls of designing location-based systems is the inhibition of established practice (Lederer et 
al., 2004). Lederer and his colleagues have therefore described in their work that such “designs 
should not inhibit users from transferring established social practice to emerging technologies.” 
This research is in part based on the spirit of the above statement.  
 
In this thesis I have articulated location privacy as a problem in the use of location-based 
applications. To this end, I have proposed a user-control model based on the use of deception to 
protect location privacy by first investigating the use of deception as an established social practice 
in location disclosure. Having also been established as being an effective tool in information 
systems security through the use of honey pots (Cohen et al, 2005), deception is yet to become a 
design consideration in social mobile computing including location disclosure. 
 
The main question that this research answers is: 
 
How can privacy needs be balanced with location sharing in mobile computing?  
This question investigates the extent to which privacy requirements and/or expectations of users of 
location-based services are met while sharing their location information with other users. 
Therefore in order to explore answers to the above question, the following questions were first 
investigated. 
1. What techniques can be used to protect location privacy? 
2. To what extent can deception be used to protect location privacy? 
3. What factors influence the use of deception to protect location privacy? 
4. How can deception be implemented in social mobile computing? 
 
1.3 Research Contribution 
The key contributions of this research are: 
i. The recontextualisation of the notion of deception from classical military warfare 
and the information systems security environments to location sharing in mobile 
computing, supported by empirical studies and the literature. This contribution also 
demonstrates that deception is a technique that can be used to protect location 
  1.4. Research Scope 
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privacy (see research sub-question 1 above) and also provides evidence of how the 
privacy requirements or needs of users of location-based services are met during 
location sharing, using deception as a means of doing this. 
ii. The design and implementation of a deception-based privacy control (DPC) model 
to protect location privacy. The DPC model provides further evidence of how 
deception can be employed practically on a mobile platform. The model also 
provides a proof of concept and the practical extent to which deception can be used 
to protect location privacy in mobile computing (see research sub-question 2 above).  
An instantiation of the DPC model in the form of an application called the Mobile 
Client (MC) further demonstrates how deception can be implemented in social 
mobile computing (reference to research sub-question 4 above). 
iii. Empirical validation of the DPC model in the form of a user study and an expert 
usability evaluation. The empirical data also demonstrates that likelihood and 
discomfort affect the use of deception to protect location privacy (reference to 
research sub-question 3 above).  
 
1.4 Research Scope 
The complex nature of privacy makes it difficult to protect. This becomes even more difficult in the 
complex technological environment presented by mobile computing. Hence, this thesis does not 
seek to address all aspects of privacy protection within the mobile computing environment. Instead, 
it contributes to earlier efforts by other researchers, and has demonstrated that established social 
practices can be supported by technology. 
 
The deception-based model described in this thesis (see Chapter 4) is limited to asynchronous 
communications among people of the same social network. It specifically protects the location 
privacy of individuals engaged in the request/disclosure dialogue. Hence, any generalisation of the 
use of this model can only prove effective in such environments. 
 
Furthermore, the prototype described in Chapter 4 is developed to work in MIDP 2.0 (Mobile 
Information Device Profile 2.0) compatible environments. The prototype is evaluated in a field-
based user study (in Chapter 5) using people who are actively involved in text or instant messaging. 
The use of a small focused group as evaluators does not completely extrapolate the model to the 
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wider population, but instead, proves within the group studied, the effectiveness of the use of 
deception to protect location privacy. 
 
1.5 Research Strategy 
The research process chosen in this thesis mainly follows five key Action Research steps (Susman 
and Evered 1978; Jarvinen 2000; Fléchais 2005). Action Research is a structured research 
approach that “identifies a question to investigate, develops an action plan, implements the plan, 
collects data, and reflects the findings of the investigation” (Johnson 1995; Fléchais 2005). The 
following is a brief description of each of the steps involved in Action Research as employed in 
this research. 
a. identifying a research question (diagnosing) – this process was largely exploratory in 
nature, where the research problem was articulated from gaps in available literature, 
presentations and discussions at conferences and workshops, etc. This step sought to 
answer research questions 1 and 2 (see Section 1.2). 
b. developing an action plan (action planning)- this involved the development of a workable 
timeline for each task that will eventually lead to answering the research questions 
identified in (a) above. 
c. implementing the plan (action taking) – This stage involved two online exploratory studies 
to establish the need for deception as a privacy control strategy, and the development of a 
deception-based location privacy control model as a prototype.  
d. gathering and analysing the data (evaluating) – Data in (c) above was collected and 
analysed to provide empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed model. Steps 
(b), (c), and (d) all contribute to providing an insight into the solutions of research 
questions 3 and 4 (see Section 1.2). 
e. Reflecting on the findings of the investigation (specifying learning) – The results of step (d) 
were used to further draw a conclusion on the significance of the contribution this thesis 
makes to location privacy protection.  
 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured along the same lines as the action steps outlined in Section 1.5.  
 
Chapter 2 surveys related literature and discusses the evolution of location privacy from the 
technological viewpoint to the introduction of established social practices in the design of privacy 
protection systems. 
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Chapter 3 describes a large scale scenario-based online study to determine the effect the use of 
deception has on discomfort and likelihood.  
 
Chapter 4 describes the overall deception-based privacy control (DPC) model upon which this 
thesis is based. It discusses two key strategies of deception (ambiguity and mis-direction 
strategies), strategic deception, and how the combination of these can provide a new way of 
ensuring plausible deniability whilst preserving existing social relationships. 
 
The rest of the chapters are based on the evaluation of the DPC model representing: 
i. A user view of the model – Chapter 5 outlines a field-based user study of investigating the 
usefulness and effectiveness of the DPC model. 
ii. An expert view of the model – Chapter 6 describes a usability study of the use of the 
Mobile Client application: a prototype developed to demonstrate the proposed model in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with key contributions of this research, a critical review of the thesis, 
and future work.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
“To tell the truth is a duty, but it is a duty only toward one who has a right to the truth.” 
- Immanuel Kant 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses privacy in general (and in particular, location privacy) and its implications 
on users of mobile devices. Various attempts by researchers to control or protect location privacy 
are explored here. It is the result of an exploratory study of relevant literature for this research. It 
begins with an in-depth discussion of privacy from the historical perspective, the origins of legal 
protection and a number of technologies used in protecting privacy in general (Sections 2.1 – 2.4). 
This chapter also discusses privacy with specific reference to mobile computing and ends with key 
research challenges in this area. This is followed by a look at some emerging technologies for 
privacy control in mobile computing and the introduction of the concept of privacy protecting noise 
to protect user privacy. Section 2.12 explores the use of deception as a privacy control mechanism, 
drawing from research in social psychology and the moral justification of deception in the major 
religions of the world. A short summary concludes the chapter raising potential issues on the nature 
of research in this direction. 
2.1 Privacy 
This section describes an overview of privacy in the general context beginning with a brief 
historical perspective, a definition of privacy for the purpose of this study, and ending with the use 
of technology to protect privacy. 
2.1.1 Historical Perspective 
The notion of privacy is not new. All through history, privacy has been mentioned either in explicit 
terms or recognised as part of a set of norms of a particular group of people. The Quran mentions 
privacy as a right of everyone (Hassan, 1996); Jewish law recognised privacy many years ago as 
being free from being watched (EPIC, 2002; Spitz, 1987); Mikhail Bakhtin (in Creation of a 
Prosaics) describes a person in terms of ancient Greek romance as an “isolated and private 
individual”(McDougall, 2004; Morson & Emerson, 1991); and the Bible also makes several 
references to privacy in (Hixson, 1987; McDougall, 2004; Moore, 1984). 
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Privacy comes from the Latin word, privatus,  meaning “withdrawn from public life, deprived of 
office, peculiar to oneself”, as opposed to publicus (which comes from pubes, meaning “the adult 
population” ) (Harper, 2001). The English word private did not exist until 1450 when it was first 
recorded (McDougall, 2004). 
 
Privacy is often perceived by many researchers as a hydra-headed multidisciplinary concept with 
observations and conceptions drawn from law, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and in recent 
times, information and communications technology. The notion of privacy is very much context-
dependent and varies across cultures and from person to person (Gordon, 2003). It therefore has no 
one-size fits-all definition (Lederer, 2003; Westin, 1967). Over the years, political and 
technological changes have helped shape the meaning of privacy (McDougall, 2004). 
 
Whereas Gavison (1984) described privacy in terms of control (Solitude: control over one’s 
interpersonal interactions with other people; Confidentiality: control over other people’s access to 
information about oneself; Autonomy: control over what one does, i.e., freedom of will), Boyle 
(2003) in his attempt to deconstruct the meaning of privacy, extended Gavison’s notion of control 
to include attention, fidelity, and identity, respectively.  
 
Whilst privacy is viewed by some as a "normalising, dynamic, social, dialectic process regulating 
self-environment interactions" (Altman, 1975), others have described it as a continuum between 
participation and non-participation in a social practice (Pedersen, 2004). Goffman writes about the 
selective disclosure and withholding of personal information in which people present different  
personal fronts for each audience they come into contact with (Goffman, 1959).  
 
Perhaps one of the most revealing definitions of privacy was a modified version of Eli Noam’s 
definition (Noam, 1997), by Jiang et al (Jiang et al., 2002) in which privacy is defined as  
 
“a highly fluid concept about controlling the dissemination and use of one’s personal information, 
one that often involves tradeoffs with efficiency, convenience, safety, accountability, business, 
marketing and usability.”  
 
The multidisciplinary nature of privacy makes it difficult, if not impossible to provide a definition 
that is accepted across domains. Nevertheless, it is useful to define the aspect of privacy that this 
thesis intends to investigate. For the purpose of this work, I define privacy in the words of Westin 
as “the claim of individuals, groups or organisations to determine for themselves when, how, and 
to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967). 
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The above working definition has been articulated in (Bellotti & Sellen, 1993) in which privacy, 
described as a user interface design issue, is based on key design principles of feedback and 
control. However, Adams (2001), in her work on privacy in multimedia environments argues “that 
the control and feedback approach to privacy negates the importance of the trade-off that users 
make in certain situations.” She suggests the significance of including contexts in any definition of 
privacy. 
 
2.1.2 Classes of Privacy 
Many attempts have been made to classify privacy in many different ways. Pedersen for instance, 
classifies privacy into solitude, isolation, anonymity, reserve, intimacy with friends, and intimacy 
with family (Pedersen, 1999 ). However, this classification does not reveal the broad issues 
underpinning private data classification in mobile computing, since the individual’s physical space 
or the communication of private information is not taken into account. The Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC) classifies privacy into four distinct types (EPIC, 2003). Apart from 
being comprehensive in its range of issues covered, their classification includes the type of privacy 
that is of relevance to this document (i.e. information privacy). Table 2.1 below describes the four 
classes of privacy according to EPIC. 
 
Table 2.1: Classes of Privacy 
Class of Privacy Description 
Information privacy  
(also termed data protection) 
describes rules that govern the way personal 
data is collected and handled e.g. data such as 
“credit information, and medical and 
government records” 
Bodily privacy involves “the protection of people's physical 
selves against invasive procedures such as 
genetic tests, drug testing and cavity 
searches” 
Privacy of communications describes “the security and privacy of mail, 
telephones, e-mail and other forms of 
communication” 
Territorial privacy concerns the setting of limits on intrusion 
into the domestic and other environments 
such as the workplace or public space e.g. 
searches, video surveillance and ID checks 
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2.2 Origins of legal protection and models of data protection 
During the 1930s and 40s, IBM-Hollerith punch card technology was used by many European 
governments to process national census data. Following the outbreak of the Second World War, 
this information was used by the occupying Nazis to identify Jews for transport to extermination 
camps (Black, 2001). As a result of this and other human rights abuses, post-war Europe codified 
strict privacy protection through international treaty and national legislation. Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) (EU, 1950) explicitly 
states that every citizen possesses an intrinsic right to their privacy in both private and family life 
(subject to some restrictions). The advent of information technology in the 1960s and 1970s saw an 
increase in the interest in the right to privacy. The first modern data protection law was enacted by 
the small German state of Hesse in 1970. Then countries like Sweden followed in 1973. These data 
protection laws gave rise to the evolution of two major international data protection instruments 
(EPIC, 2003), namely, the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (EU, 1981) and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data (OECD, 1980). 
 Most Western countries have followed suit, utilising OECD Guidelines (OECD, 1980), often cited 
as Fair Information Practices (FIP). Western European democracies were early adopters of the 
OECD guidelines on privacy, influencing the development of European Community (EC) law on 
data protection and privacy. 
Since laws affecting privacy and data protection vary from country to country, four legal 
jurisdictions (or regulatory regimes) have been identified according to research literature. They 
include: 
1. States with strong privacy protection including location-awareness: These states employ a 
combination of comprehensive national data protection laws (which also include location 
privacy protection) and sectoral laws (see Section 2.3 below). Examples include the EU and 
Japan; 
2. States with strong privacy protection: Generally, such states have comprehensive national 
data protection laws which may be combined with sectoral laws for effective privacy protection 
(e.g. Australia and Canada); 
3. States with some privacy protection: Largely a patchwork of laws which are usually sectoral 
and some self-regulation by industry (e.g. the USA); 
4. States with little to no privacy protection in law: These states mostly have some kind of 
privacy protection as enshrined in the United Nations declaration on human rights, but lack 
regulation on data protection (e.g. Ghana).  
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European privacy laws attempt to implement ‘transitive closure’ whereby data may only be 
exported from one country to a second country possessing an equivalent data protection regime; or 
where the exporter has entered into a special data protection contract with an importer willing to 
provide equivalent protection to that found in the directives (Price et al., 2005; SafeHabour, 2004). 
 
Japan has one of the greatest take-up of consumer-level mobile computing (in the form of location-
aware mobile telephone services). It was one of the first countries to define privacy regulations for 
mobile computing. Early market certainty resulted in increased business confidence and thus a 
wide proliferation of services. Similarly, thanks to well-established regulation, consumer 
confidence in new services was higher than in a completely unregulated arena (Milberg et al., 
1995) 
 
Canada and Australia have also instituted strong privacy laws, although without explicit mention of 
location-aware computing. Like the EU and Japan, each country has instituted Information/Privacy 
Commissioners with the power to take both punitive and retributive action against privacy 
violations. 
 
Worldwide, regulations requiring mobile telephone networks to provide location information to 
emergency services (e.g. E-911 in the US, E-112 in Europe) are likely to affect how privacy-
enhancing technologies can be applied.  
 
2.3 Models of Privacy Protection  
Privacy protection can be achieved through the use of laws, codes of practice, and technologies. 
Detlev Zwick and Nikhilesh Dholakia (1999) have described two models of privacy in the digital 
age. These are regulatory and self-regulatory. The regulatory model is described as a standard set 
of regulations for privacy protection, mainly for EU member countries. A self-regulatory model is 
based on businesses in the US, the EU and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the 
US.  According to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), however, privacy protection 
models can be classified as being part of a comprehensive law, sectoral law or a self-regulation 
(EPIC, 2003).  These are each described briefly below.  
1. Comprehensive Laws: These are laws that are often enacted for both public and private 
sectors to protect personal information from collection, use and dissemination. The 
European Union adopts this model to ensure compliance with its data protection laws.  
These laws include: 
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a. Directive 95/46/EC (1995) which ensures that users have access to all data held 
about them; that data is only collected with the individual’s explicit consent, and 
that it is destroyed when it is no longer needed for the original purpose. This 
directive has possible consequences for location-aware computing. For example, a 
user enters an area offering a service to which they must subscribe; must the user 
give explicit permission for the release of personally identifiable data for each new 
instance of the service? It is possible that this law may protect users, but it is 
insufficiently flexible for them to effectively utilise the inherent advantages of 
mobile technology. 
b. Directive 2002/58/EC (2002) which anticipates some measure of technological 
change. It extends Directive 95/46/EC into the telecommunications sector and 
makes explicit mention of location-aware technologies. The drafters of this 
directive were considering second and third-generation mobile telephones, but it is 
so drafted that it effectively prohibits the use of location information without the 
user's explicit informed consent. Directive 2002/58/EC requires that equipment and 
service providers offer a simple free-of-charge method for users to temporarily 
hide their location information. The directive also controls the use of cookies in 
web browsers which can be used to recover the browsing activities of an individual 
user. Another category of this model exists in countries like Canada and Australia 
often termed a “co-regulatory model” whereby privacy protection rules are 
developed and enforced by the industry and overseen by privacy agencies of those 
countries.  
2. Sectoral Laws: Unlike other Western countries, countries like the US do not possess a 
comprehensive national data protection law; the closest equivalent to a national privacy 
commissioner is the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Instead, these countries have 
sectoral laws which govern, for instance, children’s information online, video rental, or 
financial information. The disadvantage in this model is the need to enact laws when a new 
technology emerges. Sectoral laws are used in many countries to further strengthen privacy 
protection by complementing comprehensive laws. Privacy protection in the United States 
in particular, consists of a patchwork of legislation at both state and national levels 
covering distinct, narrow domains; including websites aimed at children (Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act, 1998), financial sites (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 1999), health 
insurance sites (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 1996), and certain 
baffling collections of data such as archives of videotape rentals (Video Privacy Protection 
Act, 1988) (Price et al, 2005).  
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Given the weak standards set for simple online privacy protection, there is no immediate 
prospect of legislation in the US either affording any privacy protection or impediment to 
location-aware computing. 
3. Self-Regulation: Industrial bodies usually have their codes of practice and various policies 
for data protection. However, such codes are often found to provide weak protections and 
enforcement is sometimes a major barrier to effective protection. 
2.4 Summary 
In this section, we have provided a general discussion of privacy from a historical perspective to 
current models of privacy protection. In the mobile computing environment, the timeliness and 
accuracy of location information make privacy an issue of greater concern than static online 
environments. The next sections take a look at location privacy in mobile computing. 
 
2.5 Privacy in Mobile Computing 
This section explores privacy with specific reference to mobile computing. It classifies mobile 
computing privacy in Section 2.5.1, gives an overview of technologies that have the potential of 
being privacy-invasive, and a classification of what constitutes personally-identifiable information 
and mobile computing services. The section concludes with a brief discussion of a research agenda 
of privacy in mobile computing. 
 
Mobile computing is in effect defined as, “using a computing device while in transit." (ZDNET, 
2008). It is the concept of making computers available throughout the physical environment while 
keeping them invisible to the user (OnlineDictionary, 2005). Mobile computing is the new and 3
rd
 
wave of computing. The 1
st
 wave consisted of many users to a single computer (mainframe era); 
the 2
nd
 wave of computing consisted of one computer to a user; and finally, the 3
rd
 wave is having 
many computers to one user. Mobile computing  is a subset of ubiquitous computing (defined as 
computing anytime, anywhere), which was first articulated by Mark Weiser in 1988 at the 
Computer Science Lab at Xerox PARC (Weiser et al., 1999). 
The invisible nature of mobile computing makes it difficult to see where information is flowing and 
therefore how it is being used (Weiser et al, 1999). A simple action, such as entering a shop, may 
reveal a stream of private data without the user’s knowledge of data collection, its destination, and 
without the option for user control. Others say that the use of location-based services in mobile 
computing presents a double-edged sword, in which there exists a trade-off between enhanced 
quality of life and privacy (Junglas & Spitzmueller, 2005). While some mobile computing research 
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projects explicitly address privacy (Esler et al, 1999; Abowd & Mynatt, 2000), so far solutions 
have been ad hoc and specific to the systems at hand (Langheinrich, 2001). 
2.5.1 Types of Mobile computing Privacy 
Mobile computing privacy can be broadly classified as location privacy and context privacy. 
Location privacy arises from the use of location-based services. Location-based services (LBS), 
according to the EU technical report on security and privacy for the citizen in post-September 11 
digital age (Clements et al., 2003), are classified as: 
 
1. Emergency services – With these services the location of a caller can be immediately 
transmitted to the emergency service provider. Examples include services provided by 
public services, including police, fire brigades, medical rescue applications, mountain 
rescue, or telephone help-lines. 
2. In-car services – This applies to cases where drivers and passengers get traffic, 
parking and navigation information, weather conditions, yellow pages, medical or 
breakdown assistance. The car’s position could also be monitored for assistance such 
as theft recovery. 
3. Location information services –Information is requested by users for events and 
services provided in a particular location of interest. Examples of such services may be 
“where is the nearest restaurant, ATM, etc?” 
4. Tracking and tracing – For improved efficiency and competitive advantage, 
companies may track and trace their truck fleet and courier management. This could 
also be used to track children and family members with some degree of accuracy.  
 
Barkhuus & Dey (2003) on one hand, have classified LBS as location-tracking services (in which 
the user’s location is tracked by other parties) and position-aware services which are based on the 
device itself having knowledge of its own location. This latter classification gives a broader 
meaning to the use of LBS in mobile computing. As such, any mention of LBS in this document 
will be made with reference to Barkhuus & Dey’s (2003) classification. 
 
Context privacy arises out of context of use of personal information. Since “the identity of a person 
gives a lot of second level type of contextual information” (Gross & Specht, 2001), highly 
sophisticated context-aware applications that hold information about users’ interests, preferences, 
knowledge and detailed activity logs can bring about serious privacy concerns. Time plays a key 
role in context-aware applications and information about the time of certain activities can 
compromise privacy of personal information. Examples include working hours versus weekends,  
as well as mapping the calendar of a person to get information about free versus busy hours (Gross 
& Specht, 2001). Finally, the environment or activity of an interaction also describes context, and 
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knowledge about such information in some cases may constitute a privacy concern (Spinney, 
2004).  
 
Lessig describes privacy to be shaped by a number of forces, of which technology is one (Lessig, 
1998). The next section describes some of these technologies that may be considered to be privacy-
intrusive.  
 
2.6 Personally Identifying Information & Mobile computing Services 
Personally identifiable information (PII) is defined as “information that can be used  
to locate or identify an individual, such as names, aliases, Social Security numbers, biometric records, 
and other personal information that is linked or linkable to an individual”. 
 
PII is often subjective. There is usually some amount of information whose access requires control 
by their owners (subjects); PII can range from the identity of an individual to their shopping habits. 
PII extends only to those items that can be directly or indirectly linked to a single person (or in EU-
speak a “natural person”) and does not include aggregated anonymous data. I use the term attacker 
to denote a person or organization who seeks to obtain PII without the consent of the owner. In 
order to consider what PII must be protected, one must first analyze the categories of data linked to 
an individual. Corby (2002) classifies private data into static, dynamic, and derived data. I present 
an extended version in Table 2.2 below. 
 
As the table shows, mobile computing sightings occupy the dynamic slot; adding one new data item 
composed of two parts: timestamp and location. This can be further divided by how data are used: 
either real-time (where the implied timestamp is “now”) or as a historical record. It must be noted 
that dynamic/historical data are not a new privacy risk; it has been available through such mundane 
IT applications as credit card and telephone records. Mobile computing does, however, have the 
potential to provide far finer detail about one’s location with much greater temporal precision.  
 
It should also be noted that mobile computing implicitly occupies parts of the derived data category 
since analysis of location data over time can yield crucial PII to an attacker. This classification 
motivates our examination of mobile computing services in the next section. 
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Table 2.2: Taxonomy of Data Types and Examples based on(Corby, 2002) 
Type of Data Sub-Type & Example 
Offline 
1. Bio-identity: fingerprints, race, colour, gender, height, weight, 
physical characteristics, retinal pattern, DNA 
2. Financial identity: bank accounts, credit card numbers 
3. Legal identity: government ID numbers (SSN, Passport #, 
Driver’s Licence) 
4. Social identity: membership in church, auto clubs, ethnicity 
5. Relationships: child of, parent of, spouse of 
6. Real Property Associations: home address, business address 
Identity 
Online 
Digital ID: pseudonym, E-mail address, Username, IP address, 
Password 
Tangible 
Property: buildings, automobiles, boats, mobile phones 
Personal Worth: credit balances, stock portfolios, debt balances 
Static 
Assets 
Intangible Non-real property: insurance policies, employee agreements 
Historical 
Low Resolution: Transactions: financial, travel, mobile phone records 
High Resolution: Mobile computing Sightings log (Time, Place) Dynamic 
Real-Time Mobile computing Sightings ([Now], Place) 
Analyzed 
Data derived by analyzing trends over time 
Financial behaviour 
1. Trends and changes: month-to-month variance against baseline 
2. Perceived response to new offerings: matched with experience  
Social behaviour 
Behaviour statistics: drug use, violations of law, family traits 
Tastes 
Buying patterns: purchase of item in a certain class suggests desire to 
buy other items in same class 
Derived 
Composed 
Linking Data about person to other data 
1. DNA analysis: DNA linked to human genome database infers 
tendency to disease, psychological behaviour 
2. Multi-Data linking:  e.g. knowing a device with a given MAC 
address was seen at a given place/time and knowing that the 
number is registered to a person infers person was at place/time 
 
2.7 Classifying Mobile computing Services and Scenarios 
Until recently, the lack of actual mobile computing services available to the general public has 
meant that much of the work in mobile computing privacy has used hypothetical scenarios 
analyzed as case studies. In this work, I re-use some of the popular scenarios which represent the 
range of activities available to a mobile computing user of a device with an explicit user interface. I 
classify them according to the type of data and how the service affects the user. I only consider 
scenarios where there is a privacy risk from data processing taking place beyond the user’s control. 
Therefore I do not investigate mobile computing services achieved entirely by computation on the 
user’s device. 
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Gunter et al. (2004) present four scenarios similar to those found in other work: 
FriendsInTown.com, Market Models, What’s Here?, and Travel Archive.  
 
1. FriendsInTown.com is an alerting service allowing two people to register an interest in 
being notified when they are close to one another. As soon as the criterion is satisfied both 
users are informed. Similar scenarios proposed in other work also involve being interrupted 
by a mobile computing device once a location-based criterion is satisfied. These might 
include advertising notifications where a user is alerted as they approach a product on sale, 
or a form of semi-automated check-in as one enters an airport.   
 
2. Market Models provides historical information about characteristics of a group of users 
who satisfy a certain time/space criterion; such as the average income of everyone at Penn 
Station at noon on a given day.  
  
3. What’s Here? is typical of services which provide more detail information to a user in 
response to a request about their present location. Examples include a list of forthcoming 
events in a  building, tourist points of interest (e.g. (Hong & Landay, 2004) among others), 
or the route to the nearest sushi restaurant (Duckham & Kulik, 2005).  
 
4. Travel Archive keeps a record of the datestamps and locations of people in order to answer 
queries like “where was I this time last year?” or “How many sales people did we have in 
the Birmingham area on Tuesday?” 
 
According to the data breakdown in Table 2.2 in the Dynamic section it is clear that 
FriendsInTown.com  and WhatsHere? are both examples of Real-Time data, while MarketModels 
and Travel Archive rely on historical data. Mobile computing does not bring many new issues with 
respect to Dynamic Historical data other than the possible increased resolution of sightings. Access 
to and analysis of the data does not require a mobile computing device. For the Real-Time 
scenarios, there are clearly two types of service: Interrupt-Based, where the user is alerted once 
certain criteria are satisfied, and Query-Based, where the user asks for information based on their 
current location. 
2.8 Privacy in Mobile computing: Where it hurts most 
The above discourse on privacy control in mobile computing presents us with three interesting and 
significant areas that form a broad spectrum of issues in a research agenda of privacy in mobile 
computing. These are: 
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1. Noise: The inclusion of noise (anonymising, cloaking, blurring, encryption, and lying) as a 
privacy preference.  
2. Regulatory Regimes: Recognition of the data protection jurisdiction (DPJ) as an 
important factor that influences user privacy preferences in a typical mobile computing 
interaction where participants travel across borders. Encoding relevant laws for various 
jurisdictions can help reduce false positives in privacy preference settings without users 
having to understand these laws. False positives occur when an unnecessary alarm is 
triggered for an event which should be considered privacy-friendly or privacy neutral (see 
(Adam et al., 2005)). 
3. Economic Model: The need to cater for a mismatch between privacy preferences of users 
and privacy policies of LBS. The evolution of this model is deeply-rooted in the economics 
of privacy (see (Acquisti, 2004), which has undergone a conceptual transformation shaped 
by technology.  
 
A more detailed discussion of the above can be found in (Adam et al., 2005).  
 
2.9 Privacy Control Technologies 
This section discusses privacy control technologies in mobile computing. Section 2.9.1 describes 
the principles of access, use, and collection in a privacy matrix. The privacy matrix is a useful 
starting point for privacy-sensitive designs. Section 2.9.2 critically examines the use of some 
privacy control architectures in mobile computing. This is then followed by the principles of 
privacy protecting models in mobile computing (Section 2.10), and ends with a comparison of 
privacy protecting models in mobile computing (Section 2.11). 
2.9.1 Privacy Matrix 
Gunter et al (2004) present a privacy matrix for location-based services consisting of three axes as 
illustrated in Figure 2.9-1 below. The privacy matrix represents a solution space for the design of 
privacy-sensitive architectures. The authors argue that every privacy-related issue in mobile 
computing occupies a spot in a 3D space (called the privacy matrix) below. This is true to a large 
extent if we go by my earlier definition of privacy in S 2.1.1. The next section discusses some 
privacy control architectures in mobile computing. 
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Figure 2.9-1: The Privacy Matrix. Source (Gunter et al., 2004) 
 
2.9.2 Privacy Control Architectures 
In the last decade there has been an increased interest in privacy-related research in mobile 
computing. A number of privacy-preserving, privacy-enhancing, and privacy-protecting 
technologies have been proposed, some of which have been implemented in mobile devices (e.g. 
(AT&T, 2003)). Ackerman (2004) describes these technologies in four broad categories, namely: 
encryption and security mechanisms, anonymising mechanisms (Beresford & Stajano, 2003; 
Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003), infrastructures (Hong & Landay, 2004; Langheinrich, 2002; Yamada 
& Kamioka, 2005), and labelling protocols (Cranor, 2002). 
 
Jiang et al. (2002) categorise privacy-protecting technologies into three types: prevention, 
avoidance, and detection. The authors also separate the lifecycle of personal data into three phases: 
collection, access, and second use. The three types of privacy protection mechanism together with 
the three lifecycle phases combine to form a “design space” of privacy solutions divided into nine 
two-dimensional zones. Jiang and his colleagues further stress that previous mobile computing 
privacy research has explored only a small portion of the entire design space; primarily preventive 
mechanisms for the collection and initial access of data. They point out that there is the need to 
explore other areas such as controlling the second-use of personal data, and measures for detecting 
unauthorized access of personal data.  
 
Under Ackerman’s classification, infrastructure-based privacy-protecting technologies usually 
make use of a combination of the technologies listed above. Next, I take a look at  a number of 
such infrastructures used in mobile computing. 
 
The Confab System (Hong & Landay, 2004) provides a framework for end-users and application 
developers to manage privacy within mobile computing. Confab is probably the most recent and 
most advanced privacy-sensitive architecture (Ackerman, 2004). Confab's architecture is based on 
a decentralised approach for building control and feedback mechanisms as well as a form of 
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'plausible deniability' allowing for exceptions to the emergency services. Although Confab is robust 
and supports a wide range of mobile computing applications across pessimistic, optimistic and 
mixed-initiative environments; it only supports relatively simple privacy preferences (Ackerman, 
2004). A privacy preference can be defined as the choice of what personal information about an 
individual should be revealed, how long such information should be retained and for whom it 
should be revealed. Whilst a pessimistic environment is a situation where an application prevents 
abuses, an optimistic application detects abuses of personal information. In the case of mixed-
initiative environments, information-sharing decisions are made by end-users. Pessimistic mobile 
computing applications rely on users configuring their privacy preferences beforehand. The setback 
in such applications is the unavailability of a common language that supports the expression of 
multiple privacy preferences. 
 
Langheinrich (2002) discusses a privacy awareness system, or pawS, which supports privacy in 
ubiquitous computing. The user’s device is equipped with a personal privacy assistant which 
handles the privacy preferences of users. A privacy proxy which sits somewhere on the Internet 
does the negotiation between the privacy policies of services and privacy preferences of users on 
behalf of the personal privacy assistant. pawS is designed with mechanisms that support the 
principles of notice, choice and consent, proximity and locality, and access and recourse. pawS 
supports the principle of notice by the use of beacons to announce privacy policies to users. Choice 
and consent are supported by negotiating disclosure according to the privacy preferences of users. 
Since privacy beacons announce privacy policies only to those users within their range, the 
principle of proximity and locality are supported. Finally, access and recourse are supported by the 
system’s ability to store disclosure, negotiation and service records. Apart from the system being an 
experimental one, the major setback lies in its dependence on the fact that the privacy preferences 
of users are downloaded from a trusted third party. The absence of a common language of 
expressing privacy preferences in mobile computing makes it even more difficult for it to be 
effective. Scalability is also an issue especially in areas of high beacon density (e.g. central 
business districts). Another limitation of the pawS is its inability to support multiple privacy 
preferences. For example, in real life situations, the user’s privacy preferences at a given time could 
be: “Do not disclose my location to Tesco Supermarket, but allow Woolworth to know and retain 
my location information for 30 minutes”. If mobile computing systems are to support evolving 
social practices (Palen, 1999), then the pawS inspires mobile computing research to even greater 
heights by motivating further exploration of the above limitations. 
Yamada & Kamioka (2005) have proposed an Encapsulated Mobile Agent-based Privacy 
Protection (EMAPP) which is similar to the notion of a pawS except that the personal privacy 
assistant is made up of a privacy proxy which in turn is an encapsulation of users’ privacy 
preferences, personal data, and a mobile agent. This encapsulation is termed a privacy capsule. A 
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location-based service within a mobile computing environment has a service proxy which contains 
the privacy policy of the service as well as a mobile agent. The mobile agents handle privacy 
preference negotiation between the service and privacy proxies. EMAPP is built on the same 
privacy beacon principle of the pawS. They therefore have similar limitations, except that EMAPP 
has the advantage of preventing the copy and misuse of personal information once initial access is 
granted. Apart from the limitations in expressing privacy preferences and scalability, the use of 
mobile agents introduces performance overheads as a crucial research issue in EMAPP 
implementation.  
 
The privacy control architectures mentioned above have largely been built to protect privacy based 
on widely accepted principles. The next section takes a look at some privacy protecting systems 
and how requirements for privacy protection are derived from OECD’s fair information practices. 
 
2.10 Principles of Privacy Protecting Systems 
Privacy protecting systems rely on declarations and laws of data protection. The OECD’s Fair 
Information Practices (FIP)  contain a broad set of guidelines for controlling the use of personally 
identifiable information (OECD, 1980). Therefore, the significance of the use of these guidelines in 
abstracting requirements for privacy protection systems cannot be over-emphasised. In this section 
I discuss the derivation of these principles from the OECD’s guidelines and provide an extension 
by looking at two principles of privacy protection in mobile computing: the principle of minimum 
asymmetry and approximate information flows. 
2.10.1 Requirements from Privacy Principles 
Many countries have implemented data protection legislation to protect civil liberties since the 
OECD publication in 1980 of guidelines on the protection of privacy and transborder flows of 
personal data. Most of these laws are based on the OECD’s fair information practices and form the 
basis for consumer privacy protection (see Table 2.3).  
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Table 2.3: Privacy Principles from the Fair Information Practices 
Principle Description 
1. Collection limitation 
 
Data collectors should only collect information that is necessary, and should do so by 
lawful and fair means, i.e., with the knowledge or consent of the data subject. 
2. Data quality 
 
The collected data should be kept up-to-date and stored only as long as it is relevant. 
3. Purpose specification 
 
The purpose for which data is collected should be specified (and announced) ahead of 
the data collection. 
4. Use limitation 
 
Personal data should only be used for the stated purpose, except with the data subject’s 
consent or as required by law. 
5. Security safeguards 
 
Reasonable security safeguards should protect collected data from unauthorized access, 
use, modification, or disclosure. 
6. Openness  
 
It should be possible for data subjects to learn about the data controller’s identity, and 
how to get in touch with him. 
7. Individual participation 
 
Data subjects should be able to query data controllers whether or not their personal 
information has been stored, and, if possible, challenge (i.e., erase, rectify, or amend) 
this data. 
8. Accountability 
 
Data controllers should be accountable for complying with these principles. 
 
 
The nature of mobile computing technologies described earlier suggests that it is not sufficient to 
derive privacy policies only from the above principles so as to protect the privacy of data owners. 
Jiang et al (2002) propose the principles of minimum asymmetry and approximate information 
flows which can be used as a basis for deriving additional privacy policies for mobile computing 
applications as well as LBS providers. The next section discusses these principles in detail. 
2.10.2 Deriving privacy principles in mobile computing from the principles of 
minimum asymmetry and approximate information flows 
Jiang et al (2002) propose a principle of minimum asymmetry which reduces an imbalance of 
information flow between different parties taking part in data collection in mobile computing. The 
basis of this according to them is by seeing privacy as being about information flow control, in 
which a party involved in the use of the information has more information than the other (a 
condition often termed externality). The idea of externality was originally used by economists to 
describe connections, effects, and relations that are not considered in the course of a transaction 
(Ellis & Fellner, 1943; Jiang et al., 2002). This could be explained in a situation where an 
individual’s personal information is collected by a service provider for the sole purpose of 
providing a particular service, eventually leading to the second use of such information by other 
third parties without the consent of the data owner. In this case, the data owner has little 
information of who uses their data, and for what purpose. Such a situation according to Jiang et al 
(2002), leads to negative externality usually imposing a burden on people without their consent. 
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The proposed principle of minimum asymmetry does not seek to solve privacy problems 
technologically, but applied as a design goal in mobile computing, addressing the other three forces 
(markets, norms, and legislation) according to Lessig (1998). The authors also proposed an 
approximate information flows (AIF) model that describes the flow of information involving 
various actors in three abstractions, namely, storage, data flow, and end-user perspectives. By 
approximating the flow of information and minimizing asymmetry, their proposed model suggests 
new privacy solutions that are socially-compatible, among other things. 
Minimum asymmetry is achieved by: 
 
1. Decreasing the flow of information from data owners to data collectors and users,  
2. Increasing the flow of information from data collectors and users back to data owners. 
 
Minimum asymmetry can be achieved by such methods as; anonymising and pseudonymising, 
increasing the granularity of location data, increasing the rate at which location information is sent 
back to the server, among other things. Any method that can be used to decrease the flow of 
information to achieve minimum asymmetry is termed noise as described in Section 2.11 below. 
 
Three privacy-sensitive properties can be abstracted from the above principles. These are, 
persistence of data (from which we derive the notion of retention time of data), accuracy of data 
(which includes introduction of noise), and the confidence of data (uncertainty of data). Whilst 
persistence and accuracy of data can be applied to identity, location, and other contextual 
information, the uncertainty of data is usually useful in the capability of a particular technology in 
determining location information (e.g. the percentage certainty of sensors in determining a user’s 
location, as against that for a GPS device).  
Table 2.4 provides an extension of the principles listed in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.4: Additional Properties for privacy policy derivation in mobile computing 
Property Description 
Location data rate of update This is the rate at which data about the location of the 
user and/or device is updated on a central server 
Retention time The lifetime of the data e.g. users can set the location 
information they have used for a coffee shop finder to 
persist for just 5 minutes, preventing others from using 
such information later. 
Accuracy of data (Introduction of Noise) Preventing the true meaning of the data from being 
revealed Examples include: Anonymity, cloaking, 
blurring, hashing, and lying (deception) 
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2.11 Comparison of Privacy Protecting Models in Mobile computing  
Previous work aimed at helping mobile computing users protect their privacy, which generally 
means their location privacy, can be divided roughly into two groups:  
1. policy matching: attempts to provide mechanisms for comparing a user’s policy to that of 
the mobile computing service and notifies the user of mismatches, and; 
2. noise: tries to hide or disguise a user’s location or identity. 
 
Noise is metaphorically defined as the intentional, or unintentional, manipulation or transformation 
of data preventing the true information in the data from being revealed. Noise includes, cloaking, 
blurring, anonymity (or pseudonymity), hashing or encryption, and lying (which I term benign 
deception).  Noise can be divided into five types, namely: 
 
1. anonymising: hiding the identity of the user; 
2. hashing: disguising the identity of the user 
3. cloaking: defined by Gruteser and Grunwald (2003) as the reduction in the spatial and 
temporal resolution of location information (i.e. location cloaking).  
4. blurring: decreasing the accuracy of the location (and possibly time); and 
5. lying: giving intentionally false information about location or time. 
 
Table 2.5 describes some research efforts in line with the above classification and how each is seen 
in the context of Jiang et al’s classification (2002) and work on the extension of private data 
classification (Price et al., 2005). As evidenced from the table, substantial amount of work has been 
carried out in anonymising (Wu et al, 2008; Beresford & Stajano, 2003; Gruteser & Grunwald, 
2003); blurring (Dunne et all, (2008); Duckham & Kulik, 2005; Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003); 
cloaking (Wu et al, 2008; AT&T, 2004; Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003; Hong & Landay, 2004); and 
hashing/encryption (Beresford & Stajano, 2003; Jorns & Bessler, 2004). The classification is done 
according to whether the type of privacy protection is preventive, avoidance, or detection rather 
than the classification by Ackerman (2004) for the sake of convenience.  
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Table 2.5: Comparison of Privacy Protecting Models in Mobile computing 
Author(s)/System 
Name 
Description Type of privacy protection Method of protecting privacy 
1. ( Dunne et al, 
2008;Duckham 
& Kulik, 2005) 
Location blurring to 
nearby point 
Preventive 
 
Noise (Blurring) 
2.  (Gruteser & 
Grunwald, 
2003) 
k-anonymity Preventive Noise (Blurring/Anonymity) 
3. (Beresford & 
Stajano, 2003) 
Provides unlinkability 
between pseudonyms 
Preventive Noise (hashing) 
4.  (Hong & 
Landay, 2004) 
Confab 
Privacy proxy handles 
digitally signed privacy 
metadata 
Avoidance, Preventative Matching Policies, 
Noise(Cloaking, Lying) 
5. (Langheinrich, 
2002) 
Privacy Awareness 
System (pawS) 
Use of : 
• privacy proxy 
• privacy-aware 
database 
Avoidance, Preventive 
 
Matching policies 
6. (Gunter, Carl A.  
et al., 2004) 
AdLoc 
Combining formal 
access control with 
PDRM (Personal 
Digital Rights 
Management) 
Avoidance,  Preventive Matching policies/access control 
7.  (Jiang et al., 
2002) 
Model:  
• Approximate 
Information 
Flows   
• The Principle of 
Minimum 
Asymmetry 
Prevention, Avoidance & 
Detection 
Detection, Feedback, Noise 
(Anonymity) 
8. (Lederer et al., 
2002) 
User Interface 
Metaphor: Situational 
faces metaphor – 
conceptualising end-
user  privacy 
preferences 
Preventive Matching Policies 
9. (Wu et al, 2008; 
AT&T, 2004) 
Find People Nearby 
Node anonymity in 
mobile ad hoc 
netwokrs; friend 
finding application by 
AT&T 
Preventive Noise (cloaking) 
10. (Nguyen & 
Mynatt, 2002) 
Privacy Mirror 
UI Metaphor: Privacy 
Interface (for feedback 
and detection) 
 
Detection Feedback 
 
Since the literature contains a substantial amount of work in the above techniques, I shall limit the 
scope of this thesis to techniques that represent established social practices and which present 
further research challenges in mobile computing.  
 
 
2.12 Deception in Location Disclosure as a Privacy Control Mechanism 
In this section, I define deception and discuss the moral and religious justification of its use in our 
study. Section 2.12.1 describes the legal and religious viewpoints about various forms of deception, 
whilst Section 2.13 discusses a number of deception implementations in mobile computing. 
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2.12.1 Deception 
The Oxford online reference dictionary of law defines deception as a false representation, by words 
or conduct, of a matter of fact (including the existence of an intention) or law that is made 
deliberately or recklessly to another person (Oxford Dictionary of Law, 2002). The same reference 
asserts that deception itself is not a crime, but becomes an imprisonable crime when it is involved 
in: 
 
1. Obtaining property. 
2. Obtaining an overdraft, an insurance policy, an annuity contract, or the opportunity to 
earn money (or more money) in a job or to win money by betting. These two offences 
are punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment. 
3. Obtaining any services (e.g. of a driver or typist or the hiring of a car). 
4. Causing someone to wait for or forego a debt owing to him. 
5. Securing the remission of all or part of an existing liability to make payment (whether 
one's own or another's) with intent to make permanent default in whole or in part. 
6. Obtaining an exemption from or abatement of liability to pay for something (e.g. 
obtaining free or cheap travel by falsely pretending to be a senior citizen). 
 
However, it is not an offence “to deceive someone in any other circumstances, provided there is no 
element of forgery or false accounting” (Oxford Dictionary of Law, 2002). 
 
Deception is not only an issue for legal discourse, but also an issue of grave concern to moral 
philosophers. Often synonymous to lying (the art of telling a lie), deception is seen to be morally 
wrong, though research shows its ethical justification in fields like medical ethics
1
 (Bok, 1978). For 
instance, Maximus of Tyre says “A physician deceives a sick man, a general deceives his army and 
a pilot the sailors; and in such deception, there is no wrong.” Prochus comments in Plato (360 
B.C.E.): “For that which is good is better than the truth.” 
Since the beginning of ethical speculation, two opinions about deception or lying have always 
surfaced. While Aristotle (350 BC) in his work Ethics, contends that it is never permissible to lie, 
Plato (360 B.C.E.) in his Republic is more flexible in allowing lying by Medical Doctors and 
Statesmen to lie sometimes for the good of their patients and citizens respectively (Knight, 2003). 
Religion has always played its part whenever morality is mentioned. Islam for instance, mentions 
some forms of acceptable deception. The Islamic concept of deception is called Taqiya and is 
defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Islam as a “precautionary denial of religious belief in the face 
of potential persecution (Taqiya, 2003). Stressed by Shi’a Muslims, who have been subject to 
                                                     
1 pages 182 - 202 
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periodic persecution by the Sunni majority. The concept is based on Quran 3:28 and 16:106 as well 
as hadith, tafsir literature, and juridical commentaries.”  
According to (TheFreeDictionary.com) Taqiya is part shi’a Islamic tradition originating from as far 
back as the days when shi’as were a minority and used to be persecuted by sunnis. The Shi’as were 
usually forced to curse the house of Imam Ali by Sunnis, knowing that it was the last thing a 
devout Shi’a will do. Under such circumstances, the concept of Taqiya emerged allowing Shi’as to 
lie about their belief when they thought their lives were in danger so long as they held faith true in 
their hearts. This then brings us to the notion of intention to lie.  One of the early works on this was 
by St Augustine. St Augustine’s work is perhaps one of the most comprehensive discussions of 
deception from the moral point of view. 
During the days of St Augustine (Augustine, 1952, 1961), certain deliberately deceptive statements 
were not considered as lies but deemed to be used in good conscience
2
. St Augustine described 8 
kinds of lies as pertaining to: 
 
1. Religious doctrine 
A lie:  
2. that profits no one and injures someone 
3. that profits one party so as to injure another 
4. told out of mere lust of lying or deceiving 
5. told out of the desire to please 
6. that injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money, for example. 
7. that injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death 
8. injures no one and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body 
 
In Summa Theologica Thomas Aquinas (1947) having regarded St Augustine’s classification as 
insufficient in the 13
th
 Century, distinguished 3 kinds of lies as officious (often told for useful 
purposes); jocose (told for fun); and mischievous lies (usually told to harm someone).  
Aquinas agreed that only the 3
rd
 lie constituted a mortal sin whilst officious and jocose lies were 
less serious. The pattern of lies as described in the Summa Theologica is still being followed by 
catholic theologians today
3
 (Bok, 1978). 
 
Immanuel Kant
4
 “on a supposed right to lie for altruistic motives” summed up his belief as follows: 
“To tell the truth is a duty, but it is a duty only toward one who has a right to the truth.” This 
section has provided some background to different viewpoints of deception and demonstrates its 
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moral justification in various circumstances. The exposition is necessary because it provides a 
moral and ethical basis for the re-contextualisation of deception from other disciplines to the field 
of mobile computing.  
 
2.13 Deception and Mobile Computing Privacy 
A number of research efforts in mobile computing have attempted to address the notion of 
deception. Benford et al (2004) use “self-reported positioning” to disclose the location of players of 
a location-based game, “Uncle Roy All around You”, using an electronic map. In this game, 
players can lie about their location in order to rendezvous with Uncle Roy, an elusive character, as 
they move round a 3D model of a city. This is perhaps one of the first known location-based 
systems to implement the notion of deception in location disclosure. However, since the method of 
self-reported positioning has been successfully applied only to location-based games, I argue that a 
lot more needs to be investigated in terms of location-based services in general. For instance, in 
real world settings users usually have many and/or different privacy preferences at a time: reveal 
my actual location to “A”; send a coarse granularity location to service “B”, etc. 
 
Duckham & Kulik (2005) describe a formal model for an intentional degradation of the quality of 
information in order to protect the location privacy of the owners of such information, a process 
termed obfuscation. Their work focuses on the use of imperfection in spatial information to 
obfuscate location information. Three types of imperfection can be identified in the literature: 
inaccuracy, imprecision, and vagueness, in which inaccuracy describes the absence of 
correspondence between information and reality; imprecision is the inability of information to 
describe specifics; and vagueness is described as the existence of boundary cases in information 
(Duckham & Kulik, 2005; Duckham et al., 2001; Worboys & Clementini, 2001; Worboys & 
Duckham, 2004). The obfuscation model provides a mechanism of balancing location privacy with 
a high quality of location-based service. However, no explicit attempt to completely introduce 
deception into the model has been made. The model at this stage merely implements imprecision to 
protect location privacy. 
A more advanced form of deception in location disclosure was recently developed by Iachello et al 
(2005). Iachello and his colleagues carried out quite an extensive study on a social network of 11 
participants to measure the occurrence of deception in the form of delayed answers (i.e. the user 
intentionally delays answering a location request); time-shifted answers (in which the user responds 
with a past or future location); ignored requests; and explicit deception (i.e. responding with an 
intentionally inaccurate location disclosure). Though not explicitly stated, the study assumes a 
social network to be a network of person to person interactions. However, the definition of a social 
network by (Papakyriazis & Boudourides, 2001) broadens the scope of a social network to include 
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individual people, groups of people, objects or events “as far as certain relations hold them 
together”. More so, the mode of deception implemented is manual-based, making it difficult for 
users to handle multiple deception preferences for waypoints and instant reply lists. Deception 
preferences are the options users have on how deception should be implemented during location 
disclosure. Examples include one-time deception (e.g. deceive this person about my location just 
this once), specific-time deception (e.g. allow automatic deception when my boss requests for my 
location every working day after 5pm), manual deception (always ask me to manually choose the 
location to use in implementing deception), etc. Furthermore, the study carried out by Iachello and 
his colleagues was mainly based on responses from an Experience Sampling Method (ESM) survey 
without consciously considering the reduction in dissonance that exists between the privacy 
attitudes and behaviours of participants.  
2.13.1 Summary 
In this chapter, I have progressively articulated from the literature how location privacy poses a 
research problem in social mobile computing. I have also provided an exploratory study into the 
justification of the use of deception in areas such as medical ethics and religion. Deception as has 
been described can be controversial depending on the context of its use. Research in social 
psychology has shown that deception is essential for protecting environmental privacy (i.e. the 
right to be left alone) (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Hancock et al., 2004).  However, if technology is 
to cope with social norms, then the justification of the use of deception from the moral philosophy 
viewpoint needs to be clarified. There is already ample proof that deception may have positive 
benefits to society as a whole. However, what is not certain is whether this whole concept is useful 
in controlling privacy in mobile computing. Better still, if even at all useful, the extent of this 
usefulness will be crucial in the design of privacy-sensitive architectures in mobile computing.  
 
In the next chapter, I describe an exploratory study conducted to investigate the extent to which 
deception can be used to control location privacy. The study is based on scenarios designed to cater 
for various contexts of use of deception, including its use for good purposes, in establishing social 
harmony, and based on interactions within a social network setting. 
 
  3.1. Introduction 
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Chapter 3.  To What Extent Can Deception Control 
Location Privacy? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Evidence from my own interactions and from social psychology suggests that people will 
sometimes deliberately withhold their location information to protect their privacy, among other 
reasons. However, there is the need to further explore empirically the extent to which this kind of 
deception can be extrapolated to the wider population and under what circumstances this will be 
acceptable. 
 
I present three different scenarios describing some circumstances under which deception can occur. 
Each scenario investigates the level of uneasiness participants feel by engaging in deception as well 
as how likely they will deceive when queried about their location. In order to determine the validity 
and effectiveness of responses from this study, each scenario is designed to include location 
requests coming from a spouse or partner, a parent (if any), their child(ren) (if any), a workplace 
boss, a colleague, a friend, other family member, and a stranger. For the purpose of this work, I call 
the group of these requestors the discloser’s social network. 
 
During the study (which was online based) participants were initially asked more general questions 
involving location disclosure for requests coming from each member of the social network. They 
were then taken through a set of questions involving the likelihood of sending an untrue location 
and the level of discomfort in making such a disclosure. 
 
3.2 Scenarios 
Scenarios present a powerful way of exposing a design to critique (Carroll, 2000). According to 
Carroll scenarios are stories about people and their activities. Scenarios “highlight goals suggested 
by the appearance and behavior of the system, what people try to do with the system, what 
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procedures are adopted, not adopted, carried out successfully or erroneously, and what 
interpretations people make of what happens to them.” (Carroll, 2000). Scenarios “evoke 
reflection-in-action” (Schon, 1983). 
Figure 3.2-1 describes Carroll’s five reasons for the use of scenarios for design. Scenarios 
address five key design challenges. The outer part of the scenario-based design pentagon represents 
these challenges, whereas the role scenarios play in addressing those challenges is illustrated in the 
body of the pentagon.  
My choice of employing scenarios in this research is underpinned by the very same reasons 
outlined by Carroll, especially, the use of scenarios to evoke reflection in designs. This is because 
with the flexibility that comes with scenarios, it is much easier to carefully design good scenarios 
that will not only capture the key design considerations but also help in evoking the right kind of 
reflection in action. Other options that could have been employed include the use of case studies. 
However, with the relatively limited use of location-based services by the general public, very few 
case studies if at all existent, will serve this purpose.  
 
Figure 3.2-1: Reasons for Scenario-based Design (Carroll, 2000) 
3.3 Study Objectives 
The objective of this study was to investigate the feasibility and acceptability of the use of 
deception to protect location privacy by: 
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a. using scenarios to gather data. The scenarios employed in this study include the 
use of deception for good purposes; the use of deception to preserve or enhance 
social harmony; and the use of deception in circumstances other than for good 
intentions or preserving social harmony. 
b. exploring the general acceptability of the use of deception in each of the above 
scenarios. 
c. finding out limitations for the use of deception in each of the above three 
scenarios. 
Key goal indicators for this study include: 
1. The likelihood of the use of deception across the above three scenarios. 
2. The level of discomfort expressed after engaging in deception across the above three 
scenarios. Discomfort in this study is defined as the uneasiness experienced by participants 
when they have disclosed an untrue location. 
3. The percentage of study participants who will engage in deception or forms of it to protect 
their privacy. 
The advantage of the use of scenarios is that it is possible to carry out studies on systems that are 
yet to be developed (Lederer et al., 2003). The low cost expense in the use of online scenarios 
makes it popular among researchers in this area. 
However, scenarios come with a price to pay if they are not well structured to prevent study 
participants from misunderstanding what they try to illustrate. Secondly, such studies run the risk 
of getting results that may be in cognitive dissonance, where participants’ actual behaviour may be 
different from their stated preferences (Lederer et al., 2003). 
3.4 Preliminary Study 
The study was conducted in two stages. Initial data collection was done with participants drawn 
from an email sent to staff and students of the faculty of Maths and Computing of the Open 
University. The essence of the pilot study was to help identify any questionnaire design issues as 
well as potential technical setbacks that might have an impact on the study. The pilot study took 
one week to complete. As the design was based on The Open University’s Elsa
5
 survey system, I 
had no significant questionnaire design layout issues during the pilot stage, paving the way for the 
real study. The only issues recorded had to do with clear, concise and meaningful questionnaire 
construction. 
                                                     
5 http://elsa.open.ac.uk  
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3.5 Method 
3.5.1 Participants 
Study participants were 394 members of a research panel of Open University (OU) students called 
‘PRESTO’. The PRESTO panel is representative of the entire OU population of students. However, 
the average age is slightly older than the average student age in the United Kingdom. The PRESTO 
panel consists of OU students who have volunteered to take part in online research surveys 
conducted by staff of the University. The group was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, this panel had 
been taking part in similar surveys (e.g. the privacy and self-disclosure online project - 
http://www.york.ac.uk/res/e-society/projects/15.htm) and therefore, it was not difficult to reach 
them via one email. Secondly, the demographic distribution of participants in the PRESTO panel 
(consisting of the 18 – 90 year age range across the whole of the United Kingdom, in the case of 
this study) makes them a unique group of people to participate in large scale studies of this nature. 
Participants did not have go through the trouble of filling forms to opt in. They were part of a 
dedicated pool of study participants in the Open University who had accepted to take part in such 
studies. Therefore emails were sent out to the pool with permission from the moderator. Out of 682 
emails that were sent out to potential participants via The Open University’s Elsa system, 394 read 
the introduction. A total of 382 either finished one or more complete scenarios, representing 
96.95% of all those who attempted the study.  
An initial response rate of 60.43% was achieved in this study, but after responses that did not 
provide results for a complete scenario were removed, the final response rate was 58.59%. 
Of the 394 participants, 45% (178) were male, 53% (209) were female, whilst 2% (8) had no 
demographics available. The mean age of the sample was 43.3 years, (range: 18 – 90 years, SD = 
10.55). A total of 1774 responses were recorded during the study as shown in Table 3.1 below and 
captured by the Elsa system.  
 
Table 3.1: Breakdown of Overall Participation 
 Number  Percentage 
of all 
approached 
Percentage 
of all 
available 
Participants Approached via Email 682 - - 
Bounced Back Emails 27 3.96% - 
Participants Opting Out 3 0.46% - 
Total No. of Participants available 652 95.6% - 
Available Participants Who Began the study 394 57.78% 60.43% 
Participants Who Completed 1 or More Scenarios/Sub-
studies 
382 56.01% 58.59%   
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3.5.2 Materials 
Since this study was web-based, the only item needed for each study participant was a computer 
with internet access. Data collection and analysis was straightforward with the Elsa system as it has 
an in-built capacity to collect raw survey data in any format defined by a study. 
3.5.3 Procedure 
The study was divided into four parts, namely, (i) general location disclosure methods, (ii) 
disclosure of an untrue location for good purposes, (iii) disclosure of an untrue location to 
maintain social harmony, (iv) disclosure of an untrue location for reasons other than the above. I 
chose not to limit the last scenario (in (iv) above) to a specific one such as “for a bad reason” 
because I wanted to make the options open to participants, in order to further investigate what other 
forms of deception could potentially be useful for investigation, for reasons other than for good 
purposes or to preserve or enhance social harmony. 
 The general procedure for each part is presented in the following sections. The questionnaires 
used are reproduced in Appendix A. 
3.5.3.1 General Disclosure  
In this section of the study, participants were presented with eight questions each, pertaining to 
how they would in general disclose their location to a stranger, their child(ren), a parent, a friend, a 
spouse or partner, a workplace colleague, or a boss at work. They were presented with different 
location disclosure methods to select from. These included: (i) always provide exact location; (ii) 
give false location information; (iii) vary the precision of location (iv) ignore location request; and 
(v) other methods of disclosure. Details of this can be found in Appendix A. The percentage of 
participants responding to each question is shown in Table 3.3. Section 3.6 below presents an 
analysis of responses recorded for this part of the study. 
 
3.5.3.2  Disclosure of an untrue location with a good intention 
This section of the study was divided into two parts, with each part containing seven sets of 
questions. On one part, participants were asked how likely they were to disclose a false location to 
each of the following: their child(ren), a parent, a friend, a spouse or partner, a workplace 
colleague, or a boss at work. A scale of 1 to 5 was used to score each response. “1” represents a 
“very likely” response to each question. “5” represents a “not at all likely” response. Appendix A 
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Section B shows the study in detail. Table 3.4 and Figure 3.6-2 below show the mean responses for 
each question. An analysis of this is also provided in Section 3.6.2. 
In the second part of this study, participants were asked how comfortable they were in disclosing 
a false location to each person presented in the first part of the study (if even with a good 
intention), namely: their child(ren), a parent, a friend, a spouse or partner, a workplace colleague, 
or a boss at work. A scale of 1 to 5 was used to score each response, with “1” representing “very 
comfortable” and “5” representing “not at all comfortable”. In order to express this range of 
comfort in a consistent way across my results, I use the term discomfort as the base expression and 
have mapped these to  a score of “1” representing a low level of discomfort (as per the definition of 
discomfort in Section 3.3), whereas a score of “5” represents a high level of discomfort. This less 
formal definition of comfort/discomfort and the subsequent analysis is intended to examine the 
possible impediments to use of the techniques to protect privacy (with specific emphasis on 
location). Table 3.4 shows the mean level of discomfort recorded for each question by all 
participants. An analysis of this is described in Section 3.6.2.2. 
 
3.5.3.3 Disclosure of an untrue location to maintain social harmony. 
This is similar to the previous section, except that the purpose for a false disclosure is different. 
In this case participants were told that the reason for disclosing a false location was to maintain 
social harmony, e.g. in situations where one is running late to meet a friend, colleague, boss, 
parent, child, spouse or partner, or other family member, but does not want them to know they still 
have not set off yet. The scores for likelihood and level of discomfort were captured and recorded 
in the same way as the previous section. 
3.5.3.4 Disclosure of an untrue location for reasons other than the above 
This part of the study was conducted in the same way as in Sections 3.5.3.2 and 3.5.3.3 above. 
However, participants were to think of reasons for an untrue location disclosure other than for a 
good purpose or to maintain social harmony. The scores were captured and recorded in the same 
way as described above. Analysis of this is found in Section 3.6.3.3 below. 
 
3.6 Results, Data Analysis and Findings 
In this section, we present results of each part of the study and analysis of the findings. Table 3.2 
below presents a breakdown of the responses provided for each scenario or section of the study. 
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Table 3.2: Breakdown of Responses by Scenarios 
Study/Scenario No. of responses 
General Disclosure 382 
Deception for Good Intentions 361 
Factors Influencing Plausible 
Disclosure  
337 
Deception to Enhance Social 
Harmony 
353 
Deception for Other Purposes 341 
 Total:             1774 
 
3.6.1 Investigating how location is disclosed in general to a requestor 
Participants were asked how they thought they would disclose their location to requests coming 
from people within their social networks in circumstances where it would be in no way 
embarrassing to reveal their location. The following sections describe the results obtained for 
requests coming from each person within their social network. 
 
 
Table 3.3: Response Rate for General Strategies in Making Location Disclosures 
 
Requestor 
 Spouse/Partner Friend Colleague 
Workplace 
Boss Parent Child 
Other 
Family Stranger 
Always provide 
exact location 80.1% 39.7% 35.3% 29.5% 52.8% 77.3% 45.3% 1.1% 
Give false 
location 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 1.6% 2.5% 0.8% 0.5% 5.3% 
Blurring 13% 46.1% 43% 40.7% 21.6% 15.6% 43.9% 10.1% 
Ignore request 4% 10.2% 17.8% 22% 10.1% 3.4% 7.3% 79% 
Other strategy 2.4% 3.5% 3.7% 6.2% 13.1% 2.8% 3% 4.5% 
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Figure 3.6-1: Perception of the Use of Disclosure Strategies for Requests Coming from Each 
Member of the Discloser's Social Network 
 
3.6.1.1 Disclosure Method: Always Provide Exact Location 
In general, most participants will disclose their exact location to requests coming from their 
immediate family members within their social network. 80.1% will disclose their exact location to 
a spouse or partner, 77.3% will disclose to a request coming from their children, 52.8% from their 
parents, and 45.3% to other family members. In contrast, less than 40% will disclose their exact 
location to a friend, workplace colleague, boss, or a stranger (representing 39.7%, 35.3%, 29.5%, 
1.1% respectively). 
 
3.6.1.2 Disclosure Method: Provide False Location 
Explicitly disclosing false location information scored the lowest disclosure rate (from 0.5% to 
5.3%).  5.3% will disclose a completely false location to a request coming from a stranger or 
someone they did not know.  
3.6.1.3 Disclosure Method: Varying the precision of location (Blurring) 
A small percentage of participants (13%) will intentionally blur their location before disclosing it to 
their spouses or partners. Blurring as a technique of withholding location information was popular 
with requests coming from friends, workplace colleagues, bosses, and other family members 
(representing 46.1%, 43%, 40.7% and 43.9% respectively). 
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3.6.1.4 Disclosure Method: Ignoring Location Request 
Though some participants will ignore requests coming from the rest of the members of their social 
network, a high percentage (79%) will completely ignore requests coming from strangers or people 
they did not know. 
 
3.6.1.5 Disclosure Method: Other Strategies 
Fairly low disclosure rates were recorded for other strategies not explicitly included in this study. 
These strategies range from generic excuses (network busy, etc) to switching off one’s phone. Only 
requests coming from parents recorded a rate above 10% (i.e. 13%), followed by requests coming 
from a workplace boss (6.2%). 
3.6.2 Withholding Location Information for Good Purposes 
As has been described in Chapter 2 Section 2.12.1, some forms of deception are seen to be engaged 
in with good intentions. Examples of such forms of deception with specific reference to location 
disclosure include the following scenarios. 
You are in a gift shop about to buy a present for a loved one. Disclosing your true location to the 
recipient of the present is likely to give them an indication of the activity in the shop. Therefore, 
when requested for one’s location by the recipient of the gift at the time of buying the gift, I 
describe the disclosure of an untrue location in this case as deception for good purposes. Hence, I 
classify the deliberate disclosure of a false location in less harmful situations (often called white 
lies) as deception for good purposes. 
For each of the questions in this scenario, study participants were asked to imagine that they had 
mobile phones that were equipped with location sensing and disclosure functionality. They were 
further asked to imagine they were in a gift shop about to buy a surprise gift for a person, and that 
they had set their phones to reveal a different but plausible location to that person when they asked 
for their location.  
 
Table 3.4: Mean Likelihood and Level of Discomfort for the Disclosure of a False Location 
with a Good Intent 
Requestor 
Mean Likelihood 
(Range 1-High, 5-Low) 
Mean Level of Discomfort 
(Range 1-Low, 5-High) 
Spouse/Partner 2.97 3.67 
Boss 2.85 3.04 
Parent 4.06 4.08 
Child 3.89 4.15 
Colleague 2.85 2.89 
Friend 3.04 3.36 
Other Family 3.03 3.34 
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Figure 3.6-2: Mean Likelihood of Disclosing a False Location with a Good Intent 
 
3.6.2.1 Likelihood of Disclosing a False Location for Good Intentions 
Using a 1 to 5 scale corresponding respectively to very likely to not at all likely, the mean 
likelihoods are shown on Table 3-5 above. 
The mean likelihood of disclosing a false location for good purposes is fairly constant (~3) for 
requests coming from a spouse/partner, workplace boss, workplace colleague, friend, and other 
family member. However, there was less likelihood to disclose a false location to a parent or 
child (~4). 
The following quotes illustrate some of the opinions participants recorded regarding how they 
will disclose their locations with good intentions: 
 
• As it is with good intentions, I would feel it's more of a "white lie" than a serious deception, 
as it's to avoid spoiling the surprise. 
 
• As long as giving false location wouldn't cause any problem or lead to any harmful 
situation 
 
• I believe my location should only be available to close friends and family 
 
• If buying a gift then I would always feel okay about giving a false location 
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It is clear from the above comments that although participants had varied reasons for their 
responses, a clear pattern emerged from the study. That is, participants may disclose a false 
location to people in their social network, even to  their parents or children. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6-3: Mean Level of Discomfort after Disclosing a False Location with a Good Intent 
3.6.2.2 Level of Discomfort after Disclosing a False Location for Good Intentions 
A measure of the level of discomfort participants will have after disclosing a false location with 
a good intent gives an indication of how effective this kind of deception will be in protecting 
location privacy. On a scale of 1 (low level of discomfort) to 5 (very high level of discomfort), 
there was generally some level of discomfort in disclosing a false location to all members of 
the participants’ social networks. The mean level of discomfort was high for requests coming 
from their parents or children (slightly above 4), echoed by the following comments from some 
of them: 
• Likelihood and comfort depend on the right of the person to know where I am. Child has 
highest right then wife, boss etc 
 
• I am very comfortable about family and friends being able to track me, but uncomfortable 
about others being able to do so, except in an emergency and at my choosing 
 
• I would only feel comfortable in any of these circumstances if it was for a good intention - 
anything else is just the same as lying, and I will happily lie to hide a good secret but not a 
bad one 
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3.6.3 Deception as a Tool to Enhance Social Harmony 
Enhancing social harmony is one of the reasons why people sometimes engage in deceptive 
practices as outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.12.1. Study participants were taken through two 
scenarios that describe the use of deception in enhancing social harmony. For example, if one is 
running late to meet a person and yet does not want him or her to know that they have still not left, 
then we say that disclosing a location other than the true location is done out of the desire to 
maintain existing social ties. For more details on this see Appendix A. 
Table 3.5: Mean Likelihood of Disclosing a False Location to Enhance Social Harmony 
Requestor 
Mean Likelihood 
(Range 1-High, 5-Low) 
Mean Level of Discomfort 
(Range 1-Low, 5-High) 
Spouse/Partner 3.88 4.46 
Boss 2.76 3.28 
Parent 3.81 3.99 
Child 4.5 4.71 
Colleague 2.9 3.16 
Friend 3.41 3.83 
Other Family 3.56 3.91 
 
3.6.3.1 Likelihood of Disclosing a False Location to Enhance Social Harmony 
Using the same scale of 1 to 5 (1 corresponding to very likely whilst 5 means not at all likely), 
the mean likelihood of disclosing an untrue location to maintain existing social harmony is 
shown in Figure 3.6-4 below.  
 
The mean likelihood of disclosing a false location is about the same for requests coming from a 
spouse/partner or parent (~4). Requests coming from a friend or other family member are 
equally likely, though more likely than that for the spouse/partner or parent. However, the 
requestors having the most likelihood of receiving false disclosures in order to maintain social 
harmony are the workplace boss or workplace colleague. The requestor with the least likely to 
receive false disclosures for the sole purpose of maintaining social harmony is the child. This 
was not surprising, given the fact that the family relations between a parent and child far 
outweigh the other wise social relationship that may exist between them.  
 
Therefore, in terms of the likelihood of maintaining existing social relationships or enhancing 
social harmony, the workplace boss and colleague, and a friend, are those that are most likely 
to receive false disclosures when a location request is made. 
 
 
  3.6. Results, Data Analysis and Findings 
  54 
 
 
Figure 3.6-4: Mean Likelihood of Disclosing a False Location to Enhance Social Harmony 
 
This is what one participant had to say regarding the disclosure of false location to enhance 
social harmony: 
• With people I am close to I would have no problem coming clean and admitting I’m 
running late or in an awkward situation and would expect them to be understanding 
and supportive. With people I’m less close to whereas I’m uncomfortable lying, 
whatever my situation is my business not theirs 
 
3.6.3.2 Level of Discomfort after Disclosing a False Location to Enhance Social Harmony 
 
 
Figure 3.6-5: Mean Level of Discomfort After Disclosing a False Location to Enhance Social 
Harmony 
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There is a consistent pattern in the level of discomfort perceived from disclosing a false location to 
children. As in previous scenarios, the most discomfort comes from making false disclosures to 
children (4.71 in this case). However, the least discomfort comes from disclosing false locations to 
workplace colleagues and workplace bosses (representing 3.16 and 3.28 respectively), summed up 
in the following comments by a study participant: 
• I am afraid that I would not feel comfortable lying in the circumstances described 
above. It's a work thing. It would be very easy to lie to people indeed I am currently 
engaged in a running joke in work where some know the truth and others do not. This 
involves the fictitious purchase of a bottle of Grange wine from Sainsbury's at £109 
approx and charging it to expenses. Obviously I have not done this but only 3 people 
know the truth and I am waiting to fictitiously pass the financial audit for my expense 
claim. A childish thing perhaps but it makes a change to the usual office banter. 
Perhaps it is the degree to which you can cause harm, hurt and distrust. My colleagues 
are used to far worse generally and will take it in good humour. Magicians deceive but 
perhaps stage hypnotists would score badly in the deceit and harm stakes. - 
3.6.3.3 Deception in Other Scenarios 
We categorise all scenarios other than ones with good intents or to enhance social harmony as other 
scenarios. Such scenarios could either stem from malicious intents, jocous purposes, or otherwise. 
For example, if one is in a location or engaged in an activity that they will feel embarrassed for a 
location requestor to know. 
 
Table 3.6: Mean Likelihood and Level of Discomfort of Disclosing a False Location in Other 
Scenarios 
Requestor Mean (Likelihood) Mean (Level of Discomfort) 
Spouse/Partner 3.63 4.59 
Boss 2.67 3.33 
Parent 3.88 4.1 
Child 3.7 4.69 
Colleague 2.66 3.24 
Friend 3.2 3.91 
Other Family 3.09 3.89 
 
 
3.6.3.4 Likelihood of Disclosing a False Location for Other Scenarios 
The mean likelihood of disclosing a false location in this type of scenario is about the same for 
requests coming from spouse/partner, parent and child (represented as 3.63, 3.88, and 3.70 
respectively). The most likely scenario for the disclosure of a false location is the situation 
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where location requests come from a workplace boss or colleague (represented as 2.67 and 
2.66 respectively). However, the perceived likelihood for disclosing a false location to a friend 
or other family member is almost the same, i.e. 3.2 and 3.09 respectively. The responses 
captured are further echoed by statements from study participants such as the following: 
 
 
• As before, willingness to deceive would depend on specific family member 
• Why do these people need to know where I am - with the exception of the child - 24 
hours a day? 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6-6: Mean Likelihood of Disclosing a False Location for Other Scenarios 
 
3.6.3.5 Level of Discomfort after Disclosing a False Location for Other Scenarios 
Requests coming from very close family ties (i.e. spouse/partner, parent, and child) register the 
highest discomfort levels (4.59, 4.10, and 4.69 respectively) than other members of the 
discloser’s social network. As in other scenarios, the pattern of workplace boss and workplace 
colleagues registering the lowest discomfort levels (3.33 and 3.24 respectively in this scenario) 
confirms what a participant said in the following statement: 
 
• I would lie, but not feel comfortable about it to partner and family. To friends and 
colleagues, I would feel that it was not their business. 
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Figure 3.6-7: Mean Level of Discomfort in Disclosing a False Location for Other Scenarios 
 
3.6.4 Comparison of Likelihood and Level of Discomfort across All Three 
Scenarios 
Figure 3.6-8 and Table 3-8 show that though participants indicated a likelihood of disclosing an 
untrue location in the particular circumstances described above, there was also some level of 
discomfort or uneasiness in doing so.  
The possible reason for such a high level of discomfort across all three scenarios is investigated in 
Section 3.7 
 
 
Table 3.7: Summary of Mean Likelihood and Level of Discomfort Across All Three Scenarios 
Likelihood Level of Discomfort 
Scenario Mean SD Mean SD 
Good Intention 3.24 0.509 3.5 0.486 
Social Harmony 3.54 0.598 3.91 0.565 
Other Scenarios 3.26 0.492 3.96 0.559 
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Figure 3.6-8: Likelihood versus Level of Discomfort across Three Scenarios 
 
3.7 Causes of High Level of Discomfort in the Use of Deception to 
Protect Location Privacy 
In the previous study in Sections 3.1 – 3.5 there was some level of discomfort across all 
scenarios. Could the discomfort be the result of a strong ethics opinion on the part of study 
participants? Did the participants’ fear of being found out (after engaging in disclosing a false 
location) play a major role in the high level of discomfort? These questions are further explored in 
this section in which an online between subjects study was carried out to investigate the reasons for 
the high level of discomfort. 
 
3.7.1 Method 
This follow on study had a different group of participants from the first study. Therefore in this 
section the method used in obtaining responses from study participants is described in detail. 
3.7.1.1 Participants 
Study participants were drawn from The Open University’s Elsa panel. In all an email was sent 
to approximately 900 people of which 503 valid responses were recorded. The same study protocol 
was used in this study as the first study described in Section 3.5. 
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3.7.1.2 Materials 
As in the previous study, the only requirement for this study was access to internet. The detailed 
contents of the study can be found in Appendix B. Participants did not have to fill in consent forms 
as they were recruited from the Open University panel of study participants, who had signed up to 
be used for such purposes as and when they arise. 
3.7.1.3 Procedure 
In this follow on study, participants were asked to imagine that they were in a gift shop about to 
buy a surprise gift for a friend. While they were in the shop, their phone beeped. This was a 
message from their friend, the intended recipient of the gift, asking where they were. Two possible 
response options were presented to participants to disclose. These were: 
i. Disclosing an completely untrue location, and 
ii. Disclosing an intentionally blurred location. 
In each scenario, participants were asked to assume that there was a high possibility or very little 
possibility that their friend or intended recipient will discover that they had not been entirely 
honest in disclosing their location. The aim of such a scenario was to find out if deception detection 
was an issue of concern to participants or ethics played a significant role in the level of discomfort. 
Since the participants and mode of administration of this brief study were the same as the previous 
study (using The Open University’s ELSA system), refer to Sections 3.1 – 3.4 for further details of 
this study.  
3.7.2 Findings and Discussions 
Data was extracted using SPSS, a statistical tool used in data analysis. Details of the processed 
data are found in Appendix C. In this section, we present sanitized data for the purpose of 
articulating the key observations of this sub-study. 
3.7.2.1 Deception Detection and Level of Discomfort 
These scenarios used a Likert scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents the situation in which 
participants have the least discomfort with the use of deception to protect location privacy, whereas 
a score of 5 represents a very high level of discomfort. Results extracted from the data presented 
Table 3.9 (see also Appendix C) and illustrated in Figure 3.7-1 below show that for a scenario in 
which there is a high possibility of deception discovery, there is a high level of discomfort using 
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the technique of deception to protect their location privacy.  A Chi-square test confirmed this to be 
significant (X² = 16.650 (df=4), P<0.05). Refer to Appendix C. 
 
 
     Figure 3.7-1: Level of Discomfort Vs. Possibility of Deception Discovery 
 
Table 3.8: Level of Discomfort for Different Possibilities of Deception Discovery 
95% Confidence Interval Possibility of 
Discovery 
Mean Level of 
Discomfort Standard Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
High Possibility of 
Discovery 2.856 0.085 2.689 3.024 
Low Possibility of 
Discovery 2.381 0.091 2.202 2.559 
 
 
3.7.2.2 Effect of Location Privacy Protection Technique on the Level of Discomfort  
Restricting the techniques used to protect location privacy to explicit disclosure of an untrue 
location and intentionally blurring the location to the recipient, Figure 3.7-2 (and for that matter 
Table 3.10) shows that there was much lower level of discomfort in the use of blurring (2.321) than 
outright deception (a score of 2.916) at 95% confidence interval. A Chi-square test confirmed this 
to be significant (X² = 23.219 (df=4), P<0.05). Refer to Appendix C. 
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     Figure 3.7-2: Level of Discomfort Vs. Location Privacy Protection Technique 
 
Table 3.9: Mean Level of Discomfort for Various Techniques of Location Privacy Protection 
95% Confidence Interval Technique Used to 
Protect Location Privacy 
Mean Level of 
Discomfort Standard Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Deception 2.916 0.086 2.748 3.085 
Blurring 2.321 0.09 2.144 2.498 
 
3.7.2.3 The Role of Ethics in the Use of Deception 
In this part of the study, a score of 1 indicates that the scenario is perceived by the participant as 
very much an ethics issue, whereas a score of 5 is perceived not to be an ethics issue. The average 
mean for this scenario was 3.104 and a standard error of 0.089 at 95% confidence interval. A low 
possibility of deception detection scenario was perceived to be less of an ethics problem (i.e. a 
score of 3.238, above the avearge mean level of ethics concern) than a scenario with a high 
possibility of detection (2.971, i.e. below the average mean level of ethics concern) during an 
explicit deception disclosure. However, using blurring as a technique, there was less ethics concern 
for both scenarios of low and high possibility of detection. This is further illustrated in Figure 3.7-3 
below. A Chi-square test confirmed this to be significant (X² = 35.342 (df=4), P<0.05). Refer to 
Appendix C. However, a Chi-square test between the level of ethics concern and the possibilities of 
deception detection showed that the difference in level of ethics concern is not significant. 
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Table 3.10: Mean Level of Ethics Concern for High and Low Possibilities of Deception Detection 
Mean Level of Ethics Concern 
  
  
Scenario Deception Blurring 
High Possibility of Detection 2.971 3.875 
Low Possibility of Detection 3.238 3.872 
Average Mean = 3.104; Standard Error = 0.089 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7-3: Ethics Concern Vs. Techniques and Possibility of Discovery 
 
3.7.2.4 Summary 
Evidence from the above discussion shows that: 
a. When the possibility of discovery of deception in a location disclosure is high, the level of 
discomfort in engaging in deception is also high, compared to a lower possibility of 
discovery which has a lower level of discomfort.  
 
b. The level of discomfort in employing blurring as a technique was lower than that with 
outright deception. 
 
c.  The data suggests a lower ethics concern with intentional blurring than outright deception. 
 
The above observations provide a background for the design of deception-based techniques to 
protect location privacy, in particular, with the intent of reducing the level of discomfort. 
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3.8 The Role of Strategic Deception in Location Disclosure 
 
Table 3.11: Disclosure Factors Influencing Strategic Deception 
Disclosure Factor Frequency Percentage (%) 
Location of Requestor 38 11.3 
Reason for Request 264 78.8 
Don’t Want to Know 14 4.2 
Other 19 5.7 
 
Strategic deception is the type of deception which takes advantage of prior knowledge of the 
victim's context to employ a more plausible and difficult to detect type of deception (Christian & 
Young, 2004). Knowing the requestor’s context (location in this case) makes it easier for the choice 
of a difficult to detect location, which makes sense at the same time. However, a key challenge in 
designing strategic deception for social mobile location systems is how the knowledge of context is 
presented in order to prevent the victim from knowing (the discloser in this case). 
 
To investigate the usefulness of this kind of deception participants were asked what information 
about the requestor they will want to know before disclosing their location (assuming it was 
possible to know such information on their mobile phones). This was conducted with further 
assumptions that: 
• the discloser knew the identity of the requestor 
• the requestor was a member of the discloser’s social network 
These assumptions were made because previous research shows that knowledge of the requestor’s 
identity is a significant factor in determining how location is disclosed (Lederer, 2003). Hence, I set 
out to investigate if the requestor’s location and the reason for a location request formed an integral 
part of the disclosure process. 
 
 78.8% of the 335 participants who attempted this section stated that they would like to have prior 
knowledge of the reason for a location request before making a disclosure, whilst 11.3% would be 
interested in the approximate location of the requestor. However, 4.2% did not want to know 
anything prior to making a disclosure and 5.2% would want to know disclosure factors other than 
the reason for a request and location of requestor. 
 
Therefore based on the above, we say that if strategic deception is described as having prior 
knowledge of the context of the requestor, then the factors that are likely to affect it are reason for 
a request and the approximate location of the requestor. 
In this case, study 1 revealed that 89% of people will find it useful to know the approximate 
location of requestor and the reason for a request prior to disclosing their location. 
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3.9 The principle of strategic deception (PSD) in plausible location 
disclosure  
A key feature of the concept of strategic deception is the knowledge of the victim or in this case 
the requestor (recipient of the disclosed location). This is about knowledge of who is making the 
request (enquirer), knowledge of the particular situation during the time of request, knowledge of 
the location of the requestor, and knowledge of the face of the requestor (Lederer et al., 2003). 
Lederer describes the metaphor of situational faces in which for every situation, a person wears a 
face as an abstraction of a set of privacy preferences. Whenever a person changes their privacy 
preferences, they are deemed to be changing faces, according to Lederer. A lot of empirical work 
has been carried out and the dependence of location disclosure on the enquirer, the situation and 
face has already been established (Lederer et al., 2003). Hence, basing our assumption on this fact, 
the knowledge of the requestor’s location becomes the only interesting phenomenon to investigate 
in strategic deception. Therefore we define the Principle of Strategic Deception (PSD) as:  
 
In social mobile computing, if A requests to know the location of B, in order to disclose an 
ethically prudent, appropriate, and plausible location to A, B should have a fair idea of where A is. 
 
Irrespective of whether the disclosed location is false or not, the above statement will hold.  
The advantages associated with the use of strategic deception include:  
1. Avoiding the disclosure of too much information, e.g. a request comes from someone in 
another continent. It may not be useful disclosing a fine-grained location such as “I’m at 
Tesco, Kingston”. Rather, it may be more useful saying, “Milton Keynes, UK” or just 
“UK”. 
2. Avoiding ambiguity in location disclosure. Knowing an approximate location and reason 
for a location request will help the disclosing entity (can either be the mobile device or 
person disclosing location) to avoid sending ambiguous disclosures to the requestor. 
Examples include disclosing a location as just “at the shop” or disclosing a more specific 
location such as “at ASDA, MK” depending on who is making the request, where the 
requestor is, and the reason for request.  
3. Plausible deniability. To be able to disclose a false location that is plausible enough, it will 
be useful for the disclosing entity to know an approximation of the location of the 
requestor and the reason for request. 
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Figure 3.9-1: Usage Scenario Describing How a Request and Disclosure are Made Between 
Two Mobile Client Users. 
 
Figure 3.9-1 above illustrates how the PSD is implemented within the mobile phone platform. First, 
a request A0 is sent with the requestor’s location in a different message using a different port 
number such that the recipient of the request does not see it him/herself. A1 is only sent between 
the discloser engines of the requestor and discloser. This message does not get into the native 
messaging inbox of the user’s phone because it is a control message or signal of some sort. As the 
concern of our design is not to inhibit established social practices, the control message should not 
be seen to be interfering with the request/disclosure interaction.  
 
Figure 3.9-2 below describes the flow of execution of the various components of the architecture of 
the deception-based privacy control (DPC) model in a PSD setting. 
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Figure 3.9-2: Process Flow of the PSD Involving Components of the DPC Model’s 
Architecture 
 
3.10 Conclusions  
In this study, three scenarios were presented to study participants with response options on a scale 
of 1 to 5. Each scenario was further divided into two sub-scenarios, namely, how likely participants 
will be to engage in deception when a location request comes from one of 7 members of a typical 
social network (spouse/partner; boss; parent; child; colleague; friend; other family). 1 on the scale 
meant either “very likely” or “low level of discomfort” whilst 5 meant “not at all likely” or “ high 
level of discomfort”. 
 
The analysis described in this chapter provides some empirical insight as to the extent to which 
deception can protect location privacy.  This section sums up an evaluation of the findings of the 
study relative to the key goal indicators set out in Section 3.3, namely: 
 
• The likelihood of the use of deception across the three scenarios. 
• The level of discomfort expressed after engaging in deception across the three scenarios. 
• The percentage of study participants who will engage in deception or forms of it to protect 
their privacy 
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In addition, the role of strategic deception in designing for deception is also summarised in this 
section. 
 
3.10.1.1 General Location Disclosure  
An evaluation of the findings of the above study reveals that: 
a. People will disclose their exact location to location requests coming from very close 
members of their social network, namely, spouse/partner, children, and parents. For 
location requests coming from all the other members of the discloser’s social network (i.e. 
friends, workplace colleagues, workplace bosses, other members of the family, and 
strangers) the other disclosure options are more popular than an exact location disclosure. 
b. Explicitly false location disclosure is not a popular technique of protecting location privacy 
as evidenced in the analysis. However, there is still a significantly small percentage of 
people that will deliberately disclose a completely false location to strangers. 
c. People will, if at all, consider obfuscating their location information during disclosures, 
then the deliberate withholding of some location information or intentionally blurring 
location accuracy is a significant technique in protecting location privacy, according to the 
above analysis. Blurring is a popular technique for requests coming from closed family 
members as well as strangers. 
d. Ignoring location requests is hugely popular with requests coming from strangers. 
Therefore, as expected, people will most likely ignore requests coming from those they do 
not know for various reasons, such as the fear of being stalked, harmed, or even being 
bombarded by location-based unsolicited messages by complete strangers, among others. 
e. The analysis revealed that there are not many disclosure strategies apart from those 
mentioned in the study. A popular strategy that participants mentioned was to switch off 
their phones if they did not want to be bothered. Though switching off the phone is not 
always the best option, this can be useful in some circumstances. 
 
3.10.1.2 Strategic Deception 
Empirically, the analysis shows that factors influencing strategic deception are the reason for a 
location request and the location of requestor at the time of request. This is based on the 
assumption that the identity and relationship of requestor are known by the discloser, since 
location information helps determine people’s activities (Liao et al, 2005). Therefore, the 
reason for a location request can be inferred from the requestor’s location and therefore their 
activities. Hence, location is a crucial strategic deception factor. 
 
  3.10. Conclusions 
  68 
3.10.1.3 Patterns Identified in three Scenarios 
a. When disclosing a false location with a good intent during a location request, people are 
less likely to do so to their parents or children than they would to their friends, 
spouses/partners, other family members, workplace bosses, workplace colleagues or 
strangers. 
b. People experience a higher level of discomfort with disclosing a false location for good 
purposes to their children, parents or spouses/partners than they would for other members 
of their social network. 
c. People are more likely to make a false location disclosure to enhance social harmony when 
they are confronted with location requests coming from their workplace bosses, colleagues, 
and friends than they would with other members of their social network. However, they 
will be more uneasy with making such disclosures to very close family members such as 
spouses/partners, parents, children, and other family members. 
d. In scenarios other than disclosing a false location with a good intent or to enhance social 
harmony, people will be more likely to make false disclosures to workplace bosses or 
colleagues than the rest of their social network. 
 
In conclusion, the high likelihood of engaging in the use of deception across the three scenarios 
for requests coming workplace colleagues, bosses, friends, and other family members, makes 
this technique a useful one to control location privacy. However, the high level of discomfort 
for the use of false disclosures to spouses/partners, parents, and children make its use 
problematic in location privacy protection. An attempt has been made to unearth the reasons 
for this high level of discomfort. Notable among these are:  
i. whether explicit deception is used or intentional blurring 
ii. a higher possibility of deception detection suggests a higher level of discomfort, and 
vice versa. 
iii. Ethics does not play a significant role in raising the level of discomfort. From the 
evidence gathered, ethics only plays a key role when the technique used has a high 
possibility of the disclosure being detected by the intended recipient. 
 
The patterns identified above inform the design of a deception-based privacy control (DPC) 
model in Chapter 4, followed by its implementation as the Mobile Client application, which is 
based on a request/disclosure dialogue between two or more people belonging to the same social 
network. Then Chapters 5 and 6 describe the user and expert evaluation of Mobile Client prototype, 
developed on design guidelines based on the DPC model. 
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Chapter 4. Deception-Based Location Privacy Control 
Model 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 I described the absence of established social practices as a challenge in the design of 
various privacy protecting mechanisms in the mobile computing environment. Chapter 3 provided 
evidence that deception can be a social practice in certain circumstances. In this chapter, I present a 
theoretical model based on deception using a classical military deception strategy. The model 
(called the Deception-based Privacy Control (DPC) model) is based on two key strategies of 
deception implementation, namely, a-type (ambiguity-type) and m-type (mis-direction-type) 
deception strategies, abstracted from Daniel & Herbig (1982). 
 
The model is implemented in the Mobile Client application as a proof of concept. It must be 
emphasised that the proposed deception-based model is not a perfect or absolute privacy protection 
solution, but instead, complements the efforts of other researchers such as Lederer, (2003), Smith 
(2005), Langheinrich (2002). The model is meant for protecting the privacy of individuals of close 
social ties (especially within the same social network) who choose to have flexibility in the control 
of the disclosure of their location information, where necessary. As such I chose to concentrate on 
asynchronous location request and disclosure settings, typically in the form of a text messaging 
service for request/disclosure interactions (examples of such services are the MobileLocate, Friend 
Finder, ChildLocate, etc). The model is not meant for sensor-based environments where control 
over location cannot easily be achieved with existing mobile user interfaces. 
 
4.2 General Overview and Requirements 
In order to provide some understanding of the DPC model we discuss in this section the 
requirements for the design of deception with the help of a working scenario.  
4.2.1 Working scenario: 
Wilma is Fred’s wife. To take advantage of the modern location-based service that their city 
service provider (Bedrock Telecoms) provides, they both have Mobile Client software installed on 
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their mobile phones, to be able to manually or automatically locate each other, their daughter 
Pebbles, and friends Barney and Betty, who also have become fans of Bedrock Telecoms’ latest 
service. Whilst in a gift shop to buy Wilma a surprise birthday present, Fred’s phone beeps. It’s 
Wilma who wants to know where Fred is. Disclosing his true or actual location means that Wilma 
will find out to some extent what Fred is up to. One option is to ignore the location request. 
However, knowing what implications Wilma may draw from such behaviour, Fred would rather 
prefer disclosing a plausibly untrue location while maintaining the real essence of the surprise 
present, which at this time, is paramount to him. 
 
With Mobile Client, Fred has several options to disclose a plausible location that is different from 
his actual location, while making it difficult for Wilma to detect that the disclosure is false. In the 
DPC model, Fred is able to make a: 
• disclosure of a completely false location 
• disclosure of a false location plus an activity or context 
• disclosure of an ambiguous location by blurring or presenting a coarse-grained location 
• disclosure of an ambiguous multi-name location, where possible. 
 
4.2.2 Requirements for the Implementation of Deception 
For any of these disclosures to be effective and not be detected easily, 
• Fred should be able to free his conscience that the false location disclosure is for a good or 
ethical purpose. 
• Fred should be convinced that Wilma has little or no chance of detecting that the location 
disclosure is false. 
• Fred should have a fair idea of Wilma’s current location, in order not to disclose a location 
that could potentially make Wilma disbelieve him. 
• Fred should be able to know whether such a disclosure is appropriate for Wilma under 
such a circumstance or not. 
In order to achieve the above requirements, we propose a theoretical model based on the 
assumption that deception is an established social practice in general location disclosure, and a 
five-layer disclosure approach. 
 
4.3 Deception-based Privacy Control Model 
The proposed DPC model encapsulates the requirements outlined in Section 4.2 and is based on 
two key approaches, namely: 
i. A five-layer disclosure approach 
ii. Ambiguity-type and Misdirection-type disclosure strategies  
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The five-layer disclosure approach is based on the location sensing capability of the Global 
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) technology. Section 4.3.1 therefore provides some 
understanding of how a mobile phone user’s location is typically determined using cell IDs.  
4.3.1 Location Sensing Using GSM Global Cell IDs and GPS Coordinates 
The DPC model is based on a simple combination of global cell IDs and GPS coordinates for 
location determination. Within a specific spatial constraint, the location of a person or object is 
determined by their proximity to a known point of reference which can further be determined by 
wireless or physical contact (Roussos, 2002). In GSM mobile networks, such a reference point is 
usually called the base station. The diagram in Figure 4.3-1 below shows mobile phone base 
stations (represented by ∆) belonging to different networks in a section of Milton Keynes, a town in 
the south east of the United Kingdom. Base stations belonging to a particular network provider are 
connected in a cellular fashion in the form of a cluster as shown in Figure 4.3-2 below. Each 
mobile phone user must be connected to a base station in a cell to be able to make communications. 
Users are often located by the cell they are connected to. 
 
Two types of location representation exist. These are physical and semantic locations. Physical 
locations are described by the latitudes, longitudes, and sometimes the physical elevation, e.g. 52’ 
11”N by 0.52’ 23”E at 6m elevation. Semantic locations on the other hand describe the human-
readable representation or description of a place either by place semantic (e.g. M Block of the Open 
University, Walton Hall) or geographic or physical semantic (e.g. a postcode MK7 6AA) (Roussos, 
2002).  In the five-layer disclosure approach, locations are represented by place semantics rather 
than physical semantics.  
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Figure 4.3-1 A Map Showing GSM Station Mast Positions in Parts of Milton Keynes, UK 
 
Figure 4.3-2: Structure of a Cell in Mobile Network Systems 
 
Having equipped ourselves with the rudiments of location sensing using the GSM technology, we 
now move on to describe the five-layer disclosure approach and how it relates to the DPC model. 
  4.4. 5-layer Disclosure Approach 
  73 
4.4 5-layer Disclosure Approach 
The mechanism for the disclosure of location is based on a modified version of the work of Smith 
et al (2005) and that of Laasonen et al (2004). In making a disclosure, the design requirements for 
deception outlined in Section 4.2.2 above are applied to a disclosure matrix (described in Table 4.1 
below). In this way, the disclosed location has a greater chance of being ethically prudent, 
plausible, strategic, and appropriate for most contexts. 
 
In this approach, disclosure is based on a five-layer method corresponding to the granularity of 
location detail to be presented to the requestor. This is based on our experience in the use of a 
prototype we built on the Placelab tool (Intel, 2004) and on the limitations of existing GSM 
infrastructure. “Place Lab is software providing low-cost, easy-to-use device positioning for 
location-enhanced computing applications. Place Lab tries to provide positioning which works 
worldwide, both indoors and out (unlike GPS which only works well outside). Place Lab clients 
can determine their location privately without constant interaction with a central service (unlike 
badge tracking or mobile phone location services where the service owns your location 
information)” (Intel, 2004).  The 5-layer approach uses the combination of global cell ID and the 
GPS coordinates in the following format: 
 
MCC:MNC:LAC:CI:α…………………………………………..1 
 
These correspond to: 
a. Mobile Country Code (MCC) 
b. Mobile Network Code (MNC) 
c. Location Area Code (LAC) 
d. Cell Identifier (CI) 
e. α is a description of the geographical coordinates of the user (and not the base station). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4-1: 5-Layer Disclosure Model Based on Cell ID Parameter (Signature) Comparison 
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The highest layer for location comparison and subsequent disclosure is the country layer (refer to 
Figure 4.4-1 above). A key element of the country layer is the Mobile Country Code (MCC). This 
is a numeric string of size 3. If the requestor comes from a different country (as captured in the cell 
signature), then a more plausible and appropriate location to disclose will be a coarse-grained type, 
e.g. a request coming from Seattle, US to a discloser in the UK could appropriately be addressed 
simply by saying “I’m in Bath, UK”, and this perfectly makes sense. However, such a reply may 
not have the desired effect if it were meant to a request from the same country. This is where the 
use of the network and location area layers comes in.  
 
Since more than one GSM service provider exist in many countries, the network layer enables a 
location disclosure engine to determine the service providers of both the requestor and discloser. 
The Mobile Network Code (MNC), a two numeric string, is used to identify the network layer. 
 
The location area layer described by the Location Area Code (LAC), an integer between 0 and 
65535 inclusive, describes the code allocated to a particular town or city for a specific network 
provider in a specific country. The same town or city can have different LACs, one for each 
network operator. 
 
A finer-grained area, the cell layer, is that covered by the base station itself, called the cell and 
often described by the Cell Identifier (CI), which is an integer between 0 and 65535 inclusive. 
Based on the signal strength of the base station with respect to a mobile user and the fixed 
geographical coordinates of the base station, a mobile network subscriber’s position can be 
determined from a few metres to 30km. This is where the next layer, the α layer, becomes 
significant. 
 
The α layer is a description of the geographical coordinates of the user (and not the base station). 
GPS coordinates are collected over a cell layer, and then the whole location area into a database. 
Such databases are available for download from wiggle.net and maps.google.com. However, 
additional place semantics may have to be defined where necessary, since some of those defined in 
these databases may not accurately describe the same semantics for every person. It is expected that 
as more phones get equipped with GPS capability, semantic locations can easily and more 
accurately be described.  
 
Table 4.1 below describes a matrix for location disclosure based on the relative positions of the 
requestor and discloser. These relative positions represent different scenarios and which layer-
based signature to disclose for true and plausible disclosures; ambiguity-type disclosures; and 
misdirection-type disclosures.  For example, when a request comes from say, Alice (of location 
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coordinates MCC:MNC:LAC:α) to Bob (of location coordinates MCC:MNC*:LAC*:α*), in the 
five-layer approach, their signatures are first compared before any disclosure is sent to Alice. MCC 
is the same for both signatures. However, MNC:LAC:α  are different. Hence, scenario #2 will be 
chosen for disclosure. The location disclosure process is further illustrated in a flow diagram in 
Figure 4.4-2 below. Actual disclosure is done based on the set preference for Alice on Bob’s 
phone. For a simple flow process based on preferences, refer to Figure 4.4-3 below. If Bob sets 
Alice’s request to disclose the true location, then a place semantic based on the signature 
LAC:CI:α is presented to Alice as the disclosed location. For an ambiguity-type disclosure, a place 
semantic based on either LAC or LAC:CI:α is disclosed. Better still, for a misdirection-type 
location disclosure, one of four possibilities (i.e. LAC, LAC*, LAC:CI, LAC*:CI*) will be 
disclosed together with a context or activity, thus, stressing how truthful the disclosure is.   
 
To further provide some understanding in the use of the DPC model, the following describes a 
usage scenario based on Daniel & Herbig's (1982) misdirection (m-type) and ambiguity (a-type). 
 
4.4.1 Usage Scenario 
In this section, we present two scenarios to illustrate how the DPC model is used to make requests 
and disclosures. 
 
4.4.1.1 Ambiguity-type Disclosure 
Ambiguity-type disclosures are divided into two types namely:  
i. Blurring of the actual location or presenting a coarse-grained location.  
ii. Disclosing a multi-name multi-location 
Referring to the scenario in Section 4.2.1, Fred is able to prevent Wilma from knowing his actual 
location by employing either of the two ambiguity-type disclosures. Since they both live in 
Bedrock and subscribe to Bedrock Telecoms, their locations will always have the same MCC, 
MNC, and LAC. However, their CI and α will change as they move about in Bedrock. Hence, in 
choosing to disclose an ambiguous location to Wilma, a human-readable representation of the CI 
will achieve the same purpose of keeping the surprise while at the same time Fred becomes 
comfortable with having to present a less truthful or exact location to Wilma. This also satisfies the 
notion of importing established social practices into design. In real life situations, without the use 
of the Mobile Client, Fred will be able to say, “I’m at the City Centre” instead of “I’m at the 
Hallmark Gift Shop”.  
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Fred is also able to disclose a multi-name multi-location on condition that such a location is 
ambiguous enough to prevent Wilma from knowing exactly what Fred is up to. The conditions for 
use of this option are as follows: 
i. The location should not reveal the exact activity of the person. In other words, it should be 
difficult for Wilma to tell exactly what Fred is doing. For instance, “I’m in Asda”, “I’m in 
Tesco”, etc. In this case Wilma will not be able to tell exactly what Fred is doing in Asda 
or Tesco. 
ii. The location should have the same name in two or more other locations within the same 
LAC. In this case Wilma will not easily be able to tell which Tesco or Asda Fred is in, 
using the disclosures in (i) above. 
 
4.4.1.2 Mis-direction type Disclosure 
This type of disclosure is basically the addition of context information (usually an activity) to the 
actual location, false location, or an obfuscated form of the location (through blurring or 
otherwise). As described earlier in Chapter 2, the purpose of this is usually to improve the 
perceived truthfulness of the disclosed location. In this case, we are more interested in the use of 
context to enhance the perceived veracity of a false or obfuscated location. 
In our working scenario, Fred can employ this strategy by appending an activity to his false 
disclosure, say, “I’m at Starbucks drinking my favourite Mocha and thinking of you”. This is 
implemented using any false disclosure matrix output plus a human-readable context activity.  
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Figure 4.4-2: Execution Flow of Location Disclosure Process. This describes the flow process 
for disclosing a location using the Disclosure Matrix (DM) described in Table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.4-3: Disclosure Flow Process by Preferences. This outlines broadly the disclosure of a 
location, based on the set preferences for a particular request. 
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Table 4.1: Disclosure Matrix (DM) Based on the 5-layer Disclosure Model 
Scenario 
no.  
Requestor/discloser 
relative locations 
with respect to 
location signatures 
True and 
Plausible 
Disclosure - 
Semantic location 
based on: 
 
Ambiguity-type 
disclosure (based on a 
coarse-grained human-
readable location ) - 
Semantic location based 
on: 
 
Misdirection-type disclosure - Semantic 
location based on: 
 
1 
Different MCCs MCC:LAC:CI:α 
 
i. MCC:LAC 
ii. MCC 
i. MCC:LAC + Activity/Context 
ii. MCC + Activity/Context 
2 
Same MCC but 
different MNCs 
LAC:CI: α i. LAC:CI 
ii. LAC 
i. LAC:CI + Activity/Context 
ii. LAC + Activity/Context 
iii. LAC*:CI* + Activity/Context 
iv. LAC* + Activity/Context 
 
3 
Same MCC and 
same MNC 
LAC:CI: α i. LAC:CI 
ii. LAC 
i. LAC:CI + Activity/Context 
ii. LAC + Activity/Context 
iii. LAC*:CI* + Activity/Context 
iv. LAC* + Activity/Context 
 
4 
Same MCC, same 
MNC, but different 
LACs 
LAC:CI: α i. LAC:CI 
ii. LAC 
i. LAC:CI + Activity/Context 
ii. LAC + Activity/Context 
iii. LAC*:CI* + Activity/Context 
iv. LAC* + Activity/Context 
 
5 
Same MCC, same 
MNC, and same 
LAC 
CI: α LAC i. LAC + Activity/Context 
ii. LAC* + Activity/Context 
 
6 
Same MCC, same 
MNC, same LAC, 
different CIs 
CI: α LAC i. LAC + Activity/Context 
ii. LAC* + Activity/Context 
 
7 
Same MCC, same 
MNC, same LAC, 
same CI 
Α LAC i. LAC + Activity/Context 
ii. LAC* + Activity/Context 
 
 
(LAC)*: An obfuscated or completely different LAC other than the true or actual LAC-based 
location. 
Note: There is only one instance of same MCC but different MNCs, because the same criteria will 
be used for such scenarios. Computationally, making location comparisons between different 
MNCs will require querying a larger location database (often involving another network provider) 
than is the case for same MNCs. 
 
Table 4.2 below contains a list of places A, B, C, D, E, and F with their signatures.  
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Table 4.2: Example of Location Signatures 
Place Signature Latitude Longitude MCC MNC LAC CI 
A 234:15:14307:23 
 
56.0931 -4.55462 234 15 14307 23 
 
B 310:26:6183:111 
 
47.0763 -122.6952 310 26 6183 111 
C 234:10:34788:4067 52.2191 0.0772 234 10 34788 4067 
D 234:33:19713:183 52.2187 -0.0128 234 33 19713 183 
E 234:33:570:165 52.2185 0.1015 234 33 570 165 
F 234:33:10749:165 
 
52.2182 0.1021 234 33 10749 165 
 
From the above table, the MCC of places A and B are different, signifying that they come from 
different countries or country layers according the model. However, A, C, D, E, and F all have the 
same MCCs but different MNCs, LACs, and CIs. D, E, and F have the same MNC or network 
layer, coming from the same mobile network operator, but belonging to different location areas and 
cells.  
 
4.5 Implementing the DPC Model 
The DPC model provides an additional layer of flexibility in location disclosure to support the 
established social practice of presenting an intentionally obfuscated or completely untrue location 
to protect privacy among other reasons. This gives users the ability to disclose their location in very 
similar ways as they would in real world social interactions. The features of the DPC model are 
described in Figure 4.5-1 below. The important feature of the DPC model is the implementation of 
the Disclosure Matrix (DM) based on the 5-layer disclosure model described in Section 4.4.  
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Figure 4.5-1:  Architectural Representation of the DPC Model 
 
4.5.1 Architecture Component description 
In this section, we describe the various components illustrated in the architectural representation of 
the DPC model. 
i. Subject profile 
The subject profile contains information that describes the owner of the phone. It holds the name of 
the bearer or owner of the phone, the phone number associated with the person and any personally 
identifiable information used to match requests or disclosures coming from the phone. 
 
ii. Contact profile 
The contact profile contains names and phone numbers of people the subject will be contacting. 
The equivalent of this is the phonebook and its contents within conventional mobile phones. The 
subject interacts directly with the contacts profile to make requests. Each contact profile has a set 
preference, stored in a deception preference profile. 
 
iii. Deception preference profile 
This profile contains the set of deception preferences that a subject chooses to set for each contact 
in the contact profile. Typical deception preferences include: 
a. Location blurring – employing a coarse-grained location disclosure 
Subject 
Profile 
Contact 
Profile 
Deception 
Preference 
Disclosure 
Type (DT) 
Disclosure Engine (DE) 
LS 
Audit Logs 
Output: 
Disclosed 
Request 
Received 
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b. False location disclosure – disclosing an explicitly untrue location 
c. False location disclosure and an activity – a misdirection-type disclosure where location 
is disclosed with an activity or context to emphasise the truthfulness of the disclosed 
location.   
d. True location/True location and an activity – to prevent others from having the notion 
that disclosure is all about false locations, the deception preference profile also contains a 
true location option. 
iv. Disclosure type – Disclosures are either automatic or manual. Automatic disclosures rely 
on pre-set preferences for each contact and automatically compute a plausible location to a 
requestor. Manual disclosures present the subject with a screen to type in the desired 
location to be disclosed. 
v. Disclosure engine (DE) – Location computations are done within the disclosure engine. 
The DE implements the computation algorithm based on the matrix in Table 4-1 above. 
The deception design principles mentioned in Chapter 3 as well as the DM, help present a 
plausible location that is ethically prudent, appropriate, and strategic. 
vi. Output – The disclosure is displayed as output to be presented to the requestor. 
vii. Audit logs – these are time- and date-stamped logs of requests made and disclosures 
received. This can be enabled or disabled where necessary. 
 
4.5.2 The Mobile Phone Platform 
The choice of using the mobile phone platform for implementation is mainly for its increasing 
computation capability as well as the fact that it is carried by many people. Our reason for using the 
mobile phone is not very different from that by Smith et al (2005).  However, the Mobile Client is 
built on Java 2 Micro-Edition (J2ME) with Mobile Information Device Profile version 2 (MIDP2) 
and Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC). Hence, it works in many different mobile 
brand platforms rather than on only Nokia Series 60 platforms as is implemented in Smith et al 
(2005). The disadvantages of debugging difficulty and limited storage still remain an issue, though 
the latter is increasingly becoming a less problematic issue.  
 
In addition to it being a mobile social tool (Smith et al., 2005), the mobile phone satisfies many 
user interface design principles, and therefore presents the best option for implementing the DPC 
model. 
 
4.5.3 Location Sensing  
Location sensing capability within the DPC model is twofold:  
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1. A GSM-based location signature consisting of the Mobile Country Code (MCC), the Mobile 
Network Code (MNC), Location Area Code (LAC), and the Cell ID (CI). 
2. Physical coordinates made up of the latitude and longitude and represented as α. 
 
Currently, there are several databases which contain locations with GSM location signatures as 
well as their physical GPS coordinates (e.g. placelab.org, wiggle.net, googlemaps etc). Until 
mobile phones are shipped with GPS functionality, locations of interest can be downloaded from 
any of these databases for manipulation during disclosure. 
Like the Placelab project (Intel, 2004) the Mobile Client comes with a  location store which is a 
database of places of interest with their location signatures. Determination of the location which is 
based on the associated tower the mobile phone is connected to, does not rely on any additional 
hardware or device. Location accuracy is improved with the introduction of α (physical GPS 
coordinates) to the GSM signature, to a few metres. 
 
4.5.4 Coding environment 
Mobile Client has been built to facilitate the evaluation of the strategies outlined in the DPC model. 
It does not implement automatic use of the strategies as it is usually better first implementing such 
strategies manually before attempting automatic functionalities (Iachello, 2005). The development 
is in J2ME and J2ME Wireless Toolkit for the test environment. Since coding is beyond the scope 
of this research, details of the codes used are too bulky to be presented in the appendix. 
 
4.6 Functional Testing of the DPC Model 
Functional testing is basically the testing of a piece of software based on its functional 
requirements. This type of testing does not include code walkthroughs or specific details of the 
piece of software. It involves testing the key functionalities of the test target. 
Functional testing of the Mobile Client key functionalities was conducted using the J2ME Wireless 
Toolkit. The initial scope of this test was limited to four key areas, namely: 
i. Requesting a location 
ii. Preference setting (automatic or manual preference setting) 
iii. Default port testing (native messaging)  
iv. Disclosing a location 
 
However, the Wireless Toolkit could not be used to test disclosures as the test environment needed 
to be connected to a live network operator. Therefore only (i) and (ii) were tested successfully 
using the J2ME Wireless Toolkit.   
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I experimented with several versions of the interface using pilot subjects (postgraduate computing 
students) and iterated on the design until the pilot subjects were able to complete the tasks, then I 
began the evaluation. Figure 4.6-1 below shows a screen shot of making a request in the test 
environment. The contact profile of the test environment consists of one contact, “Armstrong”, and 
the menu is made up of three options, Request, Set Preferences (for the selected contact), and 
Delete.   
 
Figure 4.6-1: Screen Shot From the Test Environment on J2ME Wireless Toolkit 
 
4.6.1 Limitations 
Like every implementation of a prototype, the limitations in the implementation of the DPC model 
are no exception. The following is a look at such limitations in the implementation of the DPC 
model in Mobile Client. 
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i. Automated disclosure – The purpose of this prototype is not to demonstrate whether or 
not automated disclosure is possible, but rather to evaluate a semi-automated form of the 
proposed strategies at work. Hong et al. (2004) recommend not to start with feature 
automation in social mobile location systems. Hence automatic disclosure was not 
implemented in the prototype although the option was displayed in the interface. 
ii. Preference logic activation – The logic in the activation of deception preferences is not 
provided with the initial build of the Mobile Client prototype.  
iii. No inbuilt audit logs – Inbuilt audit logs were not implemented as they did not contribute 
to the design decisions or interface behavior. 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, I proposed a deception-based privacy control model for protecting location 
disclosure. I have shown through a scenario how the requirements for good deception 
implementation are abstracted into guidelines for the design for deception in social mobile 
computing. 
I have also proposed the use of a 5-layer disclosure model based on a modification of the global 
cell ID of GSM base station signatures and GPS coordinates. Deception design guidelines have 
been presented in the form of a disclosure matrix to aid in the design of an ethically prudent, 
appropriate, plausible and difficult to detect deception in social mobile computing.  
The Mobile Client prototype, built as proof of concept of the DPC model was tested in the field by 
real users. In the next chapter, I describe details of the study and the role the model plays in 
preserving location privacy.  
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Chapter 5. Field-based User Evaluation of the Mobile 
Client Application 
5.1 Introduction 
A field-based user study was conducted to determine the usefulness and effectiveness of the DPC 
model among users. Whereas Chapter 6 provides empirical evidence about the use of the mobile 
client with context-based scenarios in a laboratory environment, this chapter describes the use of 
the mobile client application in the field.  
 
5.2 Objectives of the study 
The aim of the user study was to test the acceptability of reasonable deception in the field.  To what 
extent would people believe disclosures under different schemes?  To what extent would members 
of a social group use personal knowledge in detecting deception?  Would deception be detected or 
accepted in a genuine setting?  Given the pragmatic constraints, the user study was intended as a 
‘proof of concept’ rather than a full-scale validation. 
 
Two pilot studies preceded the user study:  the first was intended to test both the platform and the 
feedback system; the second was intended to familiarize the participants with the systems and to 
ensure that they were working in the actual study context. 
 
5.3 Platform  
The study was conducted on the Mobile Feedback platform {www.mobilefeedback.com}. A 
number of options were considered in order to effectively capture data that will be representative of 
a typical field-based user study, reducing as much bias as possible.  
Placelab 
A modified version of Intel Research’s Placelab (www.placelab.org ) (Intel, 2004) was considered.  
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At the time of writing this thesis, Placelab was one of the best options (in the research community) 
to simulate real-time location requests and disclosures. However, multiple experiments with 
modified versions of Placelab showed that much greater programming effort is needed to tweak the 
application to suit our purpose. It was also unable  to collect real-time data of participants’ 
reactions to requests and/or disclosures in the field. 
M:Science 
A more light weight system of making requests and disclosures was therefore needed to undertake 
the user study within the timeframe at hand.  The M:Science application (www.m-science.com) 
was considered as an option, having read their success stories in institutions such as Berkshire 
College and Salisbury College. The M:Science platform enables asynchronous text messaging and 
can be used to collect data in the field. However, setting up the SMS server in a trial version proved 
problematic.  
 
Mobile Feedback 
The Mobile Feedback system became an obvious choice since no configuration was required to 
undertake simple tasks with scenarios. The Mobile Feedback setup is a two-way asynchronous text 
messaging platform employing the capabilities of the internet and mobile telephony. The platform 
enables communication between a web user and one or more mobile phone users. The web user, 
usually called the system operator is able to interact with other users in a survey or study that 
requires pushing questionnaires to users in the field. It includes group management facilities, 
messages and questions input interface, processing of the results (the group answers to a question 
initiated by the operator), display of the distribution of answers, output analysis tools, distribution 
of results by Email and SMS, and storage facilities. Users can receive one-way SMS messages or 
SMS closed end or open questions. Answering these questions is a minimal task for the user, since 
he/she employs the "REPLY TO SENDER" function and is required to type in most cases a single 
digit number only (the number of the answer he/she choose)” (www.mobilefeedback.com). 
 
Figure 5.3-1 below shows the architecture of the Mobile Feedback platform and the flow of 
information during a study. Questionnaires and scenarios are designed on the web-based platform 
and then pushed to mobile phone users via the internet and the Mobile Feedback infrastructure. The 
Mobile Feedback infrastructure consists of the Mobile Feedback Server and an SMS gateway. The 
SMS gateways relay these messages through mobile phone carriers or service providers to the 
targeted phones.  
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Figure 5.3-1: Architecture of Mobile Feedback Operation – (www.mobilefeedback.com) 
 
Figure 5.3-2 shows a screen shot of the Mobile Feedback control interface with a number of 
sessions running, where each session is a feedback dialogue with an individual participant. 
 
 
Figure 5.3-2: Mobile Feedback Screen Shot of Log of Active Sessions 
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5.4 Study Design 
The study integrated three empirical methods (scenario-based task performance, questionnaires, 
and post-task interview) into the evaluation process. Combining methods allowed capture of data 
that would otherwise have been missed in using just a single method.  
Scenario-based task performance [could participants use the disclosure strategies?]:  Roles were 
assigned to participants, either ‘requestor’ or ‘discloser’ (so that only the ‘disclosers’ would know 
which mechanisms were employed in producing responses).  Each day, participants were sent an 
alert as to what task they were to carry out that day. Each requestor was asked to make at least one 
request per weekday and a maximum of three requests per day at weekends. Each discloser was 
asked to use one particular form of disclosure for any requests during that day:  true location, true 
location with activity, false location, false location with activity, or blurred location.  Disclosers 
were given clear instructions to disclose plausible false locations, avoiding disclosures that would 
be easily detected as untrue by the requestors.  Automated daily alerts were sent via the Mobile 
Feedback application.  
 
Questionnaires:  At the end of each day, participants were asked via Mobile Feedback how truthful 
they believed each disclosure they received on that day was.   
Post-task interview:  Each participant was interviewed after the study.  Each was asked whether the 
responses they had made were those they had intended, with reference to the disclosure log.  The 
aim of the interviews was probe the basis on which they assessed the truthfulness of disclosures 
and whether they used personal knowledge in doing so.  Participants were also asked whether they 
considered that such an application would be useful in their daily life. 
The study design and all documentation were reviewed and given ethics approval by the Open 
University Human Participants and Materials Committee.  
 
5.5 Participants 
The user study needed a pre-existing social network (so that participants could bring personal 
knowledge to bear in assessing the truthfulness of location claims) that was technology savvy (to 
reduce the intrusion of the technology on the focus of the study) and mobile (to either give rich 
enough location data, or make varied location data plausible).  Therefore, groups of students from 
the local college and secondary school were identified.   
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Pilot 1:  Two students, young adult males (ages between 17 and 18) who were friends, were 
recruited from the local further education college.  Both were regular mobile phone users familiar 
with location-based technology. 
 
Pilot 2:  Four teenagers (ages between 17 and 18 and all male) were recruited from the local 
secondary school.  These teenagers were friends and therefore belonged to the same social network, 
a pre-condition for a request/disclosure dialogue throughout this dissertation.  All were regular 
mobile phone users familiar with location-based technology. 
 
User Study:  The same participants were used as for Pilot 2. 
 
Although it would have been desirable to have conducted larger-scale studies with more social 
networks, pragmatic constraints such as the number of handsets available and the duration of the 
user study constrained the scale of the study.  Under the circumstances, it is argued that one social 
network operating over a reasonable period was sufficient to demonstrate the concept and to reveal 
initial issues surrounding deception and location disclosure.  No claims of generaliseability are 
made.  The two pairs of requestors and disclosers were able to cover all disclosure strategies on 
more than one day each.  Larger-scale, more detailed follow-up studies are left to future work. 
5.6 Protocol 
1. Recruiting:  Participants were solicited at the local college and secondary school via university 
contacts with those institutions.  A one-page outline description of the study was circulated via 
email and post (see Appendix E).  
 
2. Briefing meeting (individual face-to-face meeting with each participant):  Participants were 
introduced to the study, including the concepts of truth and deception in location information, and 
were invited to ask questions.  Each was given an instruction sheet and each completed a consent 
form in order to 'opt in’. (see Appendix E). 
 
Participants were equipped with a Nokia N70 phone with Mobile Client pre-installed.  They used 
their own SIM cards. They were given mobile phone credit which exceeded the cost of the study.  
The use of the Mobile Client application was introduced, and participants were taken step-by-step 
through the necessary functions, such as making a request, a disclosure, setting disclosure 
preferences, and adding contacts.  Disclosers were introduced to the disclosure strategies. 
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3. Conduct:   
Pilot 1. 1 week 
The objectives of this pilot study were to test the various functions of the Mobile Client application 
(such as making a request, a disclosure, setting disclosure preferences, and adding contacts) and to 
test operation of the data collection platform. Participants were asked to make a variety of requests 
and to respond using any of the disclosure strategies, as they wished.  
 
A total of 23 valid requests were processed over the one-week period.  The numbers of requests per 
disclosure strategy are given in Table 5.1   All true locations were perceived as true.  All other 
categories of disclosure were perceived as true or fairly true.  Blurring was never used. 
 
Table 5.1: Disclosure Results from Pilot 1 
Disclosure number of 
instances 
perception 
true location 9 True 
true location with activity 7 3 true, 4 fairly true 
false location 1 fairly true 
false location with activity 6 fairly true 
Blurring 0  
 
The pilot study identified a number of minor technical issues with the Mobile Client application 
which were straightforward to address.  The data collection operated as predicted.  However, it 
became clear that a more structured request/disclose regime would be needed.  Because both 
participants were fully briefed about the disclosure strategies, they reported that they were primed 
to question disclosures rather than trust them, even though they perceived all disclosures as true or 
fairly true. 
 
Pilot 2. 1 week 
The objectives of this pilot study were to test the (now adjusted) functions of the Mobile Client 
application, to test the operation of the data collection platform, to test the new request/disclose 
regime, and to familiarize the user study participants with the phones, applications, and tasks. 
Roles were assigned to participants, either ‘requestor’ or ‘discloser’, in order to limit specific 
knowledge of the disclosure strategies to the ‘disclosers’.  Instructions were sent by 
MobileFeedback in the form of a text message to each participant describing the tasks to perform 
on a daily basis.  
A total of 35 valid requests were processed over the one-week period.  All true locations were 
perceived to be true or fairly true. The numbers of requests per disclosure strategy are given in 
Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Disclosure Results from Pilot 2 
Disclosure number of 
instances 
perception 
true location 17 13 true, 4 fairly true 
true location with activity 6 5 true, 1 fairly true 
false location 2 fairly true 
false location with activity 4 1 true, 3 fairly true 
Blurring 6 2 true, 4 fairly true 
 
The main issues discovered during the pilot study had to do with a relatively steep learning curve 
for one of the participants, who was not familiar with the Nokia platform. This resulted in 
occasional delay by that participant in sending requests out to the others. The look and feel of the 
Mobile Client interface changes with the underlying platform. The said participant was taken 
through the use of the Mobile Client on the Nokia platform in order to facilitate its use in the main 
user study. 
 
Another issue encountered by participants during the pilot study was that Mobile Client did not run 
all the time on participants’ mobile devices. This led to: 
o Location requests and disclosures not received at all. 
o Delayed responses. 
In order to address the above issues, participants were told to verify that the Mobile Client 
application was running on their phones at least three times a day. These reminders were sent via 
the Mobile Client at 7am, 1pm, and 7pm everyday during the main study. 
 
 
User Study:  2 weeks 
The main study was carried out over a two week period. Roles were assigned to participants, either 
‘requestor’ or ‘discloser’, with two participants in each role.  This was deliberate in order to limit to 
the disclosures the specific knowledge of the disclosure strategies and of whether the day required 
true locations or false locations.  Each day, participants were sent an alert as to what task they were 
to carry out that day. Each requestor was asked to make at least one request per weekday (out of 
school hours) and a maximum of three requests per day at weekends. Each discloser was asked to 
use a particular disclosure strategy for any requests during that day:  true location, true location 
with activity, false location, false location with activity, or blurred location.  The reason for using 
one disclosure strategy per day was to avoid erratic answers arising from a change of strategy (e.g, 
true location alternating with false location).  Automated daily alerts were sent via the Mobile 
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Feedback application. At the end of each day, participants were asked via Mobile Feedback how 
true the disclosures they received on that day were.  
 
5.7 Data Capture and Analysis 
Appendix D describes the type of data captured during each request/disclosure communication. 
Key data included the participant, the time of making a request, the type of intended disclosure (i.e. 
the disclosure strategy), the question posed to the requestor after a disclosure is made, and the 
response received from each requestor on their perceived believability of each disclosure.  
The total number of valid disclosures collated at the end of the study was 70.  
At the end of each day, a customized post-disclosure questionnaire was distributed to investigate 
the level of believability of each disclosure by the requestors. Post-disclosure data is found in 
Appendix D.  
Responses were monitored and captured on Mobile Feedback and exported into an Excel 
spreadsheet for analysis. Each request was mapped onto the associated disclosure. Key data 
processed included the score for each response, the frequency of occurrence of a score, and the 
range of scores per technique per technique employed in a disclosure. Perception categories were 
mapped to values as in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3:Score Represented by Perception of Disclosed Location to Requestor 
Perception of disclosed location to 
requestor 
Score 
very true 
1 
True 2 
fairly true 3 
not true 4 
 
In order to understand how effective each technique was perceived, the mean and standard 
deviation of each disclosure technique employed were calculated as shown in Table 5.4. While we 
make no claims as to the statistical significance of the results, the mean perception score gives an 
indication of how truthful (closer to 1) or how deceitful (closer to 4) the technique was perceived 
as.  
5.8 Findings 
Figure 5.8-1 below is an illustration of perception of disclosures by requestors showing the 
minimum (most truthful) response and the mean response for each technique with the vertial line 
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showing the range of responses. The mean perception was lowest (considered most truthful) for 
responses with blurred location (score = 1). The figures indicate a low score for both the disclosure 
of a false location (1.21) and a blurred location. The mean perception of disclosures by requestors 
was highest for disclosures that included an activity, i.e. disclosing a true location with an activity 
(mean score of 1.5) and a false location and an activity (mean score of 2.78). The disclosure of a 
true location (with a mean score of 1.86) was perceived as being less truthful than a false disclosure 
as well as blurred location disclosure.  
 
Table 5.4: Mean Perception of Disclosure by Requestor 
Technique Response Frequency Score 
Total 
Score 
Total 
Frequency Mean Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
Very True 13 13x1=13 
True  N/A N/A 
Fairly 
True N/A N/A False 
Location Not True 1 1x4=4 17 14 1.21 0.8018 
Very True N/A N/A 
True  4 4x2=8 
Fairly 
True 9 9x3=27 
False 
Location 
plus 
Activity Not True 1 4x1=4 39 14 2.78 0.5789 
Very True 8 8x1=8 
True  5 5x2=10 
Fairly 
True 1 3x1=3 
True 
Location 
plus 
Activity Not True N/A N/A 21 14 1.5 0.6504 
Very True 2 2x1=2 
True  12 12x2=24 
Fairly 
True N/A N/A True 
Location  Not True N/A N/A 26 14 1.86 0.3631 
Very True 14 14x1=14 
True  N/A N/A 
Fairly 
True N/A N/A Blurred 
Location  Not True N/A N/A 14 14 1 0 
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Figure 5.8-1: Mean Perception of Disclosure by Requestor 
 
5.9 Threats to Validity  
Some requests and disclosures were received on the native inbox instead of Mobile Client inbox. 
This led to some requests not being recorded. Hence, a reduction in total number of valid 
request/disclosure pairs may affect the validity of the evaluation process.  
 
Threats to validity associated with the scale of the study have already been discussed above.  A 
number of threats associate with the participants, in terms of cultural, gender or age bias, their 
competence with technology, the impact of their personal circumstances (e.g., the way age and 
attendance at school constrains their activity), and so on, apply.  Similarly, threats may be 
associated with the tasks, and with the imposition of the artificial request/disclose regime.  Further, 
the limitations of the current mobile phone technology, and the relative novelty of this sort of 
location disclosure, may also have an impact on behaviours.  These are all matters to address in 
further work. However, the essence of this study was not to generalize but provide evidence of 
proof of concept that the Deception Privacy Control model is feasible. 
 
5.10 Discussion 
The aim of the user study was to test the acceptability of reasonable deception in the field.   
Although the low number of participants requires caution in generalizing from the results, two 
disclosure techniques showed potential for good control of location information: the disclosure of a 
plausibly false location and the disclosure of a blurred location. 
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To what extent would people believe disclosures under different schemes?   
Contrary to what was anticipated, associating an activity with the location as a way of making false 
disclosures less easily detected, was not effective.  The mean perception scores indicate that false 
location disclosures were perceived as more truthful than either true or false location disclosures 
plus activity.  Although these findings are tentative, it appears that appending activity to a location 
disclosure raises suspicion, rather than enhancing disclosure plausibility. 
 
To what extent would members of a social group use personal knowledge in detecting 
deception?  
The post-study interviews made clear that both requestors and disclosers used personal knowledge, 
the latter in devising plausible false disclosures, and the former in interpreting the likely 
truthfulness of individual disclosures. For example, one requestor had this to say when asked of his 
perception of the veracity of a disclosure made to him: 
“I knew Adam was clearly not telling me his true location when he said he was in the club at about 
10pm yesterday. Adam doesn’t often do clubbing.” 
   
Would deception be detected or accepted in a genuine setting?   
This user study does not allow us to answer this fully.  False disclosures were never detected in this 
study.  Although the results do not rule out the possibility that deception might be detected, they do 
suggest that strong social bonds favour acceptance of plausible deception.  A more comprehensive 
study (possibly an ethnographic study), including a variety of social networks, with varying 
strengths of social bond, would be required to investigate further. 
 
 
 
5.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter, an integrated approach has been taken to provide empirical validation of the ability 
to effect a flexible control of location information. The study has provided evidence that intentional 
blurring and false location disclosures are effective in withholding location as a means of 
protecting location privacy. 
 
The study also shows that gathering data using mobile telephony can be a useful way of providing 
rich data in the field for usability research in the mobile environment.  
 
In conclusion, two techniques employed in the Mobile Client application have the potential to 
prove effective in the field. These are: 
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a. Intentionally providing plausibly false location information to the requester. The location 
presented needs to be convincing enough to serve the purpose of the distortion. The study 
showed that when this is done well enough, the recipient of the disclosed location tends to 
accept it as plausible.  
b. The deliberate blurring of location information is effective in withholding location 
information, within the limits of this study. 
 
It must be emphasized that no claims of generaliseability are made, as the sample size is not large 
enough to do so. The study provides a proof of concept of the practical implementation of the 
Deception Privacy Control model in the form of the Mobile Client application. An additional 
evaluation has been conducted to complement the field-based user evaluation. The next chapter 
describes a usability study of the Mobile Client application using Human Computer Interaction 
(HCI) experts as participants to investigate the usefulness and effectiveness of the functionality and 
principles upon which the deception-based privacy control model is based. 
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Chapter 6. Usability Evaluation of the Mobile Client 
Application 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the Mobile Client (MC) application, based on the Deception-based Privacy Control 
(DPC) model described in Chapter 4, is evaluated from a usability perspective. The design of the 
MC was informed by the results of the two large scale studies described in Chapters 3 and 5. The 
MC was built as a prototype to facilitate the flexible disclosure of location using the techniques of 
deliberately withholding location information, blurring (i.e. proving coarse-grained location 
information), ambiguity, and outright false disclosure. Instantiating the DPC model into the MC 
application provides some guidance as to how the principles underpinning the DPC model can be 
realised practically. Therefore subjecting such an instantiation to a usability study informs the 
design of potential usability problems to be encountered in the use of the MC application. The 
study described in this chapter involves the use of human computer interaction experts in 
evaluating the functionality of the MC based on certain tasks provided to participants. The rest of 
the chapter presents the study, findings, and threats to the validity of the method employed. 
 
6.2 Objectives of the study 
The aim of carrying out a usability study is to demonstrate the usability of the MC application as an 
instantiation of the DPC model.  
The key objective of this study was therefore to provide answers to the following question: 
How usable is the Mobile Client application in its use of deception to control location 
privacy? 
To specifically answer the above question, a usability study of the MC prototype was carried out, 
the results of which are discussed in this chapter.  
 
6.3 Methodology 
The highly dynamic context-based use of location-based systems makes it difficult to evaluate their 
usability using conventional user evaluation techniques. Therefore field-based usability techniques 
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have become increasingly useful in evaluating location-based prototypes (Kjeldskov et al, 2003). 
Evaluation of mobile systems is still not as widely reported as that of web-based applications. 
However, in recent times the most common method of evaluating location-based systems and for 
that matter, mobile human-computer interaction, has been laboratory-based usability evaluations 
(Kjeldskov and Graham 2003).  
In this study, I decided to employ a usability study because it involves conducting an evaluation of 
various tasks in the use of the MC application. The study was conducted in the laboratory 
environment as additional source of empirical validation to the initial field-based study conducted 
in Chapter five. 
 
6.4 The Study  
The study was conducted over a two week period. Six experts were involved. The composition of 
these participants is included: 
a) 4 practicing HCI professionals each with a PhD qualification gained in the last 18 months 
(two females and two males). 
b) 1 female senior lecturer and well-known HCI expert with a book to her credit. 
c) 1 industry-leading female HCI expert. 
 
In this study, no trials were carried out since the functionality of the MC application was evaluated 
during the user study in Chapter 5. Participants were taken through the use of the MC application 
after they had given their consent to take part in the study by filling in consent forms. The study 
was conducted in each participant’s office on an individual basis. 
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Table 6.1: Detailed Description of Tasks Used During Usability Study   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5 Data Capture and Analysis 
Each participant was given a form to fill in during each task. The form basically provided fields for 
participants to state usability problems identified and their severity ratings as described in Table 6-
1 above. 
 
During the study, the participants were engaged in a discussion on each scenario where 
clarification was required. This also provided an additional source of information for use in the 
overall analysis. Participants were also given the option to rate the usefulness of the prototype in 
Imagine you and people in your social network have a location-tracking system (on your mobile phones) 
which may permit you to keep track of each other’s location. People within your social network will 
typically include (but not limited to) friends, spouse/partner, colleagues, boss, and family. Imagine you are 
able to manipulate and control what location to reveal to whom, and at what time. Further imagine that you 
are able to disclose a location different from your true location using a privacy control feature that comes 
with the location tracking service. This gives you the ability not only to send an untrue location, but also to 
make the disclosed location look plausible enough for the requestor.  
Using the Mobile Client application, 
1. Add two contacts to the list of contacts including that provided by the study facilitator. 
2. Set location disclosure preferences that you wish to employ for automatic disclosures for each 
contact 
3. Select a contact and request for their location 
4. You would receive a request from the study facilitator. Reply to this request by making a 
disclosure.  
5. Delete a contact from the contacts list. This should be a contact other than the facilitator’s details. 
After stepping through each task, please record the usability problems you encountered, rating them as 
follows: 
• A score of 0 corresponds to a situation where you think there is no usability problem in the 
particular task you are involved in. 
• A cosmetic problem is rated a score of 1. This is given to usability problems that need not be fixed 
unless there is extra time for fixing such problems. 
• Minor usability problems should have a score or rating of 2. These are low priority problems but 
need to be fixed when deciding to fix usability issues. 
• Major usability problems (rated 3) should be given high priority and hence, should be fixed. 
• Severe usability problems, also called catastrophic usability problems must be fixed before the 
product is released. These problems are rated 4. 
 
  6.6. Findings 
  101 
general in the control of location privacy. The essence of this was to provide some kind of 
corroboration with the field-based study described in Chapter five.  
 
Problems identified for each task were analysed to determine the existence of a pattern across the 
participants. These patterns are described in the next sections. Analysis of responses was based on 
Nielson’s (1994) recommendations in his work. These are: the frequency of occurrence of each 
problem, the impact (severity rating) of the problem and persistence of the problem (i.e. whether 
users will repeatedly be bothered by such problems). 
6.6 Findings 
In total, 58 usability problems were discovered as shown in Table 6-2 below. These problems were 
rated in accordance with Nielsen’s (1994) ratings for usability studies. 
a) A score of “0” corresponds to a situation where participants think there is no usability 
problem in the particular task they were involved in. 
b) A cosmetic problem is rated a score of “1”. This is given to usability problems that need 
not be fixed unless there is extra time for fixing such problems. 
c) Minor usability problems should have a score or rating of “2”. These are low priority 
problems but need to be fixed when deciding to fix usability issues. 
d) Major usability problems (rated 3) should be given high priority and hence, should be 
fixed. 
e) Severe usability problems, also called catastrophic usability problems must be fixed before 
the product is released. These problems are rated 4. 
 
Table 6.2: No. of Usability Problems Identified by each Participant for each Problem Classification 
 Participant 
1 
Participant 
2 
Participant 
3 
Participant 
4 
Participant 
5 
Participant 
6  
Total 
Severe - 4 3 3 - 1 11 
Major 3 2 1 3 2 12 23 
Minor 3 2 5 5 2 2 19 
Cosmetic - 1 1 2 1 - 5 
Total 6 9 10 13 5 15 58 
 
 
Figure 6.6-1 below illustrates the distribution of severity of usability problems presented in Table 
6.2 above. The figure indicates that most usability problems are major and minor in severity (42) 
whilst only 16 problems discovered are either severe or cosmetic. 
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Figure 6.6-1: Distribution of Total Usability Problems by Severity 
 
Note that in Table 6.2 above, zero-score usability problems have not been included for two main 
reasons. Firstly, they present no challenges for further discussion. Furthermore, within the given 
limits of the mobile platform available most zero-score issues were platform related and hence, did 
not have a direct relationship with the model upon which the MC application is based.  
In the next sections, a distillation of the above table into the various tasks is described in more 
detail. 
 
Table 6.3: No. of All Usability Problems Identified by Each Participant for Each Task Performed 
     Participant 
 
Task 
Participant 
1 
Participant 
2 
Participant 
3 
Participant 
4 
Participant 
5 
Participant 
6  
Total 
Adding Contacts 2 (33.33%) 4 (44.44%) 4 (40%) 3 (23.07%) 1 (20%) 2 (13.33%) 16 
Preference 
Setting 
1 (16.67%) 1 (11.11) 1 (10%) 4 (30.77%) 2 (40%) 4 (26.66%) 13 
Making a 
Request 
- 2 (22.22%) 1(10%) 3 (23.07%) - 4 (26.66%) 10 
Making a 
Disclosure 
3 (50%) - 2 (20%) 2 (15.38%) - 4 (26.66%) 11 
Delete Contact - 1 (11.11%) 1 (20%) - - 1 (6.67%) 3 
Error Handling - - - - 1 (20%) - 1 
Other - 
 
1 (11.11%) 1 (10%) 1 (7.69%) 1 (20%) - 4 
Total 6 9 10 13 5 15 58 
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6.6.1 Adding Contacts 
All six participants discovered usability problems in this task. These ranged from minor to severe. 
There were no cosmetic problems recorded by all six participants in the task of adding contacts. 
Table 6.4 below shows the breakdown of problems discovered by all participants in this task. 
 
Table 6.4: No. of Usability Problems Discovered by Severity During Contact Addition 
Severity Cosmetic Minor Major Severe Total 
No. of 
problems 
0 5 4 7 16 
 
In this task, the problems discovered can be categorized into three main areas, namely, 
1. Problems related to synchronizing contacts with native phonebook entries. For instance, 
participant 6 said this when she undertook the task of adding contacts: I am not able to 
load contacts from my phonebook. Currently, the application only allows me to import 
contact numbers from the phonebook once I enter the user’s name. It’ll be good to have a 
one-off import of both name and number from the phonebook.  
2. Unable to edit contacts. Participant 3 said this of the task of adding contacts: I have just 
made a mistake in entering a contact’s number. MC does not allow me to edit the contact’s 
details. It’ll be a good idea to be able to edit any contact details at any time of the use of 
MC. 
3. Navigation problems in the contacts capture form. Participant 2 had this to say during the 
add contacts task: In the contacts form, I can’t get back to the contacts list. Perhaps adding 
a back button to options will be useful. 
 
Table 6.5: No. of Usability Problems According to the Nature of Problem During the Task of Adding Contacts 
Nature of usability problem No. of problems encountered 
Phonebook synchronization 5 
Unable to edit contacts 2 
Navigation problems in contacts capture form 9 
Total 16 
 
From the above table, majority of the problems (56.25%) were navigation problems within the 
contacts capture form. Four out of the six participants discovered these. The least number of 
problems discovered came from the lack of the ability to edit contacts (only two problems 
discovered). 
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6.6.2 Setting of Disclosure Preferences 
Thirteen usability problems were discovered in the task of setting disclosure preferences with 
severity between minor and severe, as shown below. As in the task of addition of contacts, there 
were no cosmetic usability problems recorded in this task. 
 
Table 6.6: No. of Usability Problems Discovered by Severity During the Task of Disclosure Preference Setting 
Severity Cosmetic Minor Major Severe Total 
No. of 
problems 
0 6 4 3 13 
 
Three key problems discovered during this task were: 
1. The lack of a clear visibility between the preference set and the relevant contact  to whom 
the preference is applied. For instance, participant 6 described this problem by saying: 
There is a clear lack of affordance in the preference setting task as there is no indication of 
the action that has been taken. That is, I’m not able to know at a glance whose preference 
I’m about to set. 
Similarly participant 1 said this of the same problem: preferences should have clarity as 
who they apply to. 
2. Navigation problems with the preference setting form.  Participant 2 paraphrases this 
problem in these words: Getting out of the preference form is not easy to tell as the back 
button is missing. Some kind of options button will also be useful here. 
3. The lack of flexibility in setting other preferences. Here, participant 4 had this to say: The 
application should provide enough flexibility to set preferences. For instance, there should 
be a preference option where one can select all contacts on a particular day (such as a day 
I’m in a meeting at the MoD) and disclose a false location. 
 
Table 6.7: No. of Usability Problems According to the Nature of Problem During the Task of Setting Disclosure 
Preferences 
Nature of usability problem No. of problems encountered 
The lack of a clear visibility between the preference set and the 
relevant contact  to whom the preference is applied 
6 
Navigation problems with the preference setting form 3 
The lack of flexibility in setting other preferences  
 
4 
Total 13 
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46.15% of the usability problems resulted from the lack of clear visibility between the setting of 
preferences and the relevant contact to whom the preference is applied (see  
Table 6.7 above). Four of the six participants discovered these. 
6.6.3 Making a Location Request 
Seven usability problems were discovered in the task of setting disclosure preferences with severity 
between minor and severe, as shown below. 
 
Table 6.8: No. of Usability Problems Discovered by Severity During the Task of Making a Location Request 
Severity Cosmetic Minor Major Severe Total 
No. of 
problems 
0 6 3 1 10 
 
Two key problems discovered during this task were : 
1. Issues with request notification including too short request feedback timeframe. Participant 
1 said: Since I do not remember phone numbers that easily, it’ll be good to have the 
message alert include the name of the contact rather than the contact number. 
2. The lack of flexibility in making requests such as tagging of a request to include its nature, 
e.g. requests requiring urgent attention no matter what. Participant 1 in particular had this 
to say: Since my ability to respond to a location request depends on the context of the 
request, I’ll be interested in how urgent the request is and whether I can wait and respond 
when I’m less busy. Hence, some kind of tagging of a request will be a great enhancement 
to this application. 
 
Table 6.9: No. of Usability Problems According to the Nature of Problem During the Task of Making a Location 
Request 
Nature of usability problem No. of problems encountered 
Issues with request notification including too short request 
feedback timeframe 
8 
The lack of flexibility in making requests such as tagging 
of a request to include its nature, e.g. requests requiring 
urgent attention no matter what 
2 
 
6.6.4 Making a Location Disclosure 
Seven usability problems were discovered in the task of setting making a disclosure with severity 
between cosmetic and severe, as shown below. 
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Table 6.10: No. of Usability Problems Discovered by Severity During the Task of Making a Location Disclosure 
Severity Cosmetic Minor Major Severe Total 
No. of 
problems 
1 4 5 1 11 
 
Two key problems discovered during this task were: 
1. Disclosure notification problems. Participants either found the disclosure notification 
message to be too wordy or lacked completeness. For instance, participant 1 said this: 
Though I find this method of disclosure appropriate, users could benefit by making sense of 
the time the disclosure was made. This in my opinion, is not major in terms of severity. 
2. Disclosure feedback issues. Participant 2 said of this task: I do not remember the disclosure 
I just made and I’m not able to tell whether I disclosed what I had in mind or not. This is 
where it’ll be useful including the disclosed location in the disclosure alert. 
 
Table 6.11: No. of Usability Problems According to the Nature of Problem During the Task of Making a Location 
Disclosure 
Nature of usability problem No. of problems encountered 
Disclosure notification problems 5 
Disclosure feedback issues  6 
 
6.6.5 Deleting a contact 
Only three problems were recorded by participants during this task. Whilst two participants 
perceived the lack of a clear delete warning to be of minor severity, one participant clearly saw it as 
a severe usability problem. 
 
Table 6.12: No. of Usability Problems Discovered by Severity During the Task of Deleting a Contact 
Severity Cosmetic Minor Major Severe Total 
No. of 
problems 
0 2 0 1 3 
 
The main usability problem discovered in a delete contact task was the absence of a warning prior 
to deleting a contact in the contact list. One participant (participant 6) had this to say: I just tried 
deleting a contact and I was not warned as to whether I indeed wanted to delete the contact or not. 
This is definitely a catastrophic usability problem. 
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Table 6.13: No. of Usability Problems According to the Nature of Problem During the Task of Deleting a Contact 
Nature of usability problem No. of problems encountered 
Delete Warning 3 
6.6.6 Error Handling 
Only one usability problem was recorded during the whole exercise. In this case participants were 
required to look out for errors and rate their severity.  
 
Table 6.14: No. of Usability Problems Discovered by Severity During the Task of Error Handling Evaluation 
Severity Cosmetic Minor Major Severe Total 
No. of 
problems 
0 0 1 0 1 
 
Table 6.15: No. of Usability Problems According to the Nature of Problem During the Task of Error Handling 
Evaluation 
Nature of usability problem No. of problems encountered 
Duplication of disclosure message when making 
a disclosure to a second request 
1 
 
6.7 Platform Problems 
In this study, a number of issues were raised by participants which had nothing to do with the MC 
application as a whole but just  the Nokia platform. One participant (participant 1) who is an expert 
in the evaluation of mobile systems in particular, clearly discovered less problems (5 problems in 
all) than the rest of the participants. This section outlines the platform problems that were not 
considered in the scope of this study. 
 
The MC application needs to be on all the time for requests and disclosures to be made during 
interactions. The application was tested using a Nokia 6600. On this platform, when another 
program is started whilst MC is in use, the MC application automatically runs in the background, 
allowing the user to be able to receive requests uninterrupted. Participants in this study used the 
Nokia N90 which did not allow MC to run in the background, and as such the MC application 
always closed when another application interrupted it, such as a phone call or navigating away 
from the MC application. All the participants but one saw this to be a usability problem. However, 
participant 1 (who has knowledge of mobile platforms) disagreed and explained that mobile 
applications have always faced such interaction problems because platform pervasiveness is still a 
major issue of concern in mobile computing. 
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Another platform related problem was a generic message alert that is automatically generated to 
confirm sending a text message. This is a security feature in current mobile platforms that prevent 
sending programs without user intervention. It is the same feature that is used to prevent spreading 
viruses in mobile platforms. Hence, considering such alerts as usability problems was discounted 
from the study, clearly separating what is a platform problem from typical usability issues 
bothering the design of applications for the mobile environment. 
 
6.8 Threat to Validity  
The participants’ knowledge of the particular mobile platform may have influenced navigation of 
the MC environment. Whilst one participant saw issues such as request feedback and notification 
as platform related usability problems, the others thought they were problems introduced by the 
MC application. This indeed, is a threat to the validity of the study. However, most participants 
were able to correctly identify application related usability problems, and that is what the 
conclusions of this study are based on. 
 
6.9 Discussions 
My results show that most problems came from contact addition tasks. The findings in this study 
provide guidance to the design of usable privacy control interfaces on the mobile platform. The 
most common usability problem in this task had to do with navigation in the contacts capture form. 
Then the next problem of concern to participants was request notification which also included the 
short request feedback timeframe. 
 
Then the lack of a clear visibility between the set preference and the relevant contact to whom a 
preference is applied was the next usability problem of concern to participants. This was equally as 
important as phonebook synchronization with the contacts list. 
 
The rest of the usability problems were discovered by at most four participants thus, recording a 
low frequency. In order of frequency of occurrence, here is a list of all the issues discovered during 
the exercise. 
 
1. Navigation problems in contacts capture form. 
2. Issues with request notification including too short request feedback timeframe. 
• The lack of a clear visibility between the preference set and the relevant contact  to 
whom the preference is applied. 
3. Phonebook synchronization. 
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• Disclosure feedback issues. 
4. The lack of flexibility in setting other preferences.  
• Disclosure notification problems. 
• Delete Warning. 
5. Navigation problems with the preference setting form. 
• Unable to edit contacts.  
6. Duplication of disclosure message when making a disclosure to a second request. 
• The lack of flexibility in making requests such as tagging of a request to include its 
nature, e.g. requests requiring urgent attention no matter what. 
6.10 Conclusion 
In this study, I have provided empirical validation of the ability to effect a flexible control of 
location information. This corroborates with earlier results from the field-based study, which 
demonstrates the feasibility and effectiveness of the use of the mobile platform in location privacy 
control. 
 
a. In conclusion, the study shows that effective design of location privacy systems depends on 
two key factors. The provision of clear and easy to navigate interfaces for each task to be 
carried out in a request/disclosure flow process. 
b. The ability to mimic existing patterns of use of common tasks associated with mobile 
platforms, such as instant messaging, contacts addition, feedback, etc. 
  7.1. Introduction 
  110 
 
Chapter 7. Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
In a networked world, user choice regarding what to disclose to whom is often complicated (Palen 
& Dourish, 2003). Context as emphasised by Adams (1999) helps frame behaviour (Harrison & 
Dourish, 1996). However, the sense of place (as a context), rather than space, determines behaviour 
(Harrison & Dourish, 1996). In this research, we argued user location, described as the sense of 
place, impacts social behaviour. In social interactions, the perception of users about who has access 
to their location and to what extent location is disclosed, is particularly very important because 
such location information is related to “socially determined notions of the individual within 
society” (Adams, 1999; Goffman, 1959; Agre, 1997). Therefore the scope of this thesis has been 
limited to the notion of privacy related to user location. 
 
Location privacy has in recent times become an issue of concern to privacy conscious users of 
mobile devices. As social tools, most of these mobile devices (mobile phones to be specific) are not 
built to provide the flexible control of the location of users of applications that take into account 
real-time user locations. By incorporating some social practices such as deception (whether explicit 
or intentional blurring), I contribute to better and more effective user control of the amount of real-
time location information users wish to disclose. 
By conducting online scenario-based exploratory studies, I was able to investigate the popularity of 
the use of deliberate withholding of information (called deception) among a large cross section of 
online participants. Having been certain of the high percentage of respondents willing to employ 
some kind of deception to protect their location privacy, mostly for good reasons, I proposed and 
designed a deception-based privacy control model. An instantiation of the model in the form of the 
Mobile Client (MC) application was evaluated in two different perspectives – a user study and an 
expert usability study. The aim of these evaluations was to provide validation of the usefulness  of 
the model in protecting location privacy. The results of the user evaluation shows the superiority of 
intentional blurring as a location privacy protection technique over outright deception. The 
usability evaluation was done on the prototype to investigate its usability using various tasks. A 
usability evaluation is a much quicker way of evaluating the usability of such prototypes using 
well-designed scenarios. 
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7.2 Goals & Findings   
This thesis has provided a knowledge base contribution to the mobile HCI research community in 
two ways: 
a. Model Findings 
An exploratory DPC model of user control of location privacy has been developed. The 
model encapsulates a five-layer disclosure approach and two disclosure strategies of mis-
direction and ambiguity. Empirical studies in the field revealed that disclosing a plausibly 
false location will be difficult to detect as being false. This strategy will inform the design 
of disclosure mechanisms in situations which demand the deliberate withholding of 
location information as a way of preserving privacy. 
The model also showed from field studies that blurring (i.e. intentionally regulating the 
accuracy of location information disclosed) can be a good design consideration in the 
control of location privacy. 
b. Methodological Findings 
This thesis has provided an empirical approach in its methodology. The DPC model was 
investigated using a field-based empirical study. The importance of using scenarios in an 
exploratory design has already been articulated in Chapter 4.  
7.3 Critical Review of Thesis 
Two key limitations can be leveled against this thesis. These include a limitation in: 
a) Scope, and 
b) Methodology  
In the next two sections these limitations are presented in detail. 
7.3.1 Scope 
This thesis has been limited by its scope to: 
i. Privacy resulting from location disclosure rather than privacy in other environments such 
as sensor environments. 
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ii. Peer-to-peer communications between people of same social networks rather than 
communications involving the disclosure of location information to third parties such as 
retail shops and government agencies. 
The limited scope of the thesis may suggest that its findings are limited too. However, the context-
specific definition of privacy makes it appropriate to provide a focused and in-depth study of 
privacy in this context. Despite the lack of large scale empirical studies in location disclosure, the 
findings of this research very useful in the following ways: 
a. The findings provide some pointers to location privacy system designers of 
what techniques may be useful in preserving privacy. 
b. The findings also add to the common body of knowledge in the mobile HCI 
environment as well as an emerging social mobile computing field (Smith et al, 
2005). 
7.3.2 Methodology 
The use of a small sample size for the field-based user study may seem to be unrepresentative of 
the entire user population. However, the purpose of the evaluation was not to gather data to make a 
generalization, but as proof of concept of the DPC model. 
The DPC model was implemented using Java for mobile devices (J2ME). One may argue that 
not all mobile phones are java-enabled. However, there is an increasing trend of newer mobile 
phones becoming java-compliant. Besides, building the DPC model was a proof of concept. Hence, 
having proved that the DPC model can be implemented practically, it should not be difficult to 
design the model on other platforms. 
7.4 Contributions 
This research contributes to the common body of knowledge in the area of location privacy and 
demonstrates how established social practices can effectively support technology. In particular, the 
main contribution of this research is aimed at providing a flexible location disclosure through the 
use of an established social practice - the deliberate withholding of location information to protect 
one's privacy (called deception in this work). 
 
As a recap from Chapter one, the key research question includes the following: 
 
How can privacy needs be balanced with location sharing in mobile computing?  
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1. What techniques can be used to protect location privacy? 
2. To what extent can deception be used to protect location privacy? 
3. What factors influence the use of deception to protect location privacy? 
4. How can deception be implemented in social mobile computing? 
 
To start with, exploratory evidence in the literature (Section 1.2) has provided the case for a 
privacy concern in the use of location-based services and techniques used to protect location 
privacy as discussed in Chapter 2 (refer to research sub-question1 above).   
 
The main contribution of this research is the re-contextualisation of deception from social 
psychology and information systems security to the field of location privacy. I am among the first 
to provide empirical evidence that deception is an appropriate technique for protecting location 
privacy. This was done by conducting a large scale scenario-based online study to investigate how 
likely participants were to use deception as a location privacy protection technique. In addition, I 
have conducted usability studies to examine suitability, usefulness and effectiveness of a 
deception-based privacy control model. These studies have provided, within the limits of the 
research, evidence of the extent to which deception can be used to protect location privacy 
(research sub-question 2 above). 
 
I have also provided empirical evidence in this work to explain the high level of discomfort in the 
use of deception as a technique. In particular, evidence suggests that the possibility of deception 
detection is related to the level of discomfort. That is, a higher possibility of discovery or detection 
suggests a higher the level of discomfort in the use of deception. Evidence in this research suggests 
that likelihood and discomfort are key factors affecting the use of deception to control location 
privacy (research sub-question 3). 
 
In the user validation, two disclosure techniques showed the potential for good control of location 
information. These are: the disclosure of a plausibly false location and the disclosure of a blurred 
location. These were seen to be more effective in carrying the message behind the disclosures 
across to requestors. 
 
The usability study revealed that effective design of location privacy systems depends on two key 
factors: 
a) The provision of clear and easy to navigate interfaces for each task to be carried out in a 
request/disclosure flow process. 
b) The ability to mimic existing patterns of use of common tasks associated with mobile 
platforms, such as instant messaging, contacts addition, feedback, etc. 
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In short, the contributions of this thesis can be summed up as: 
 
1. Empirical evidence that deception is good for controlling location disclosure, and therefore 
location privacy. 
2. A deception-based privacy control model depicting how deception can be implemented in 
social mobile computing (providing answers to research sub-question 4). 
3. Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of this model in controlling location disclosure. 
 
7.5 Future Work 
I recommend further work in a number of areas in order to provide a complete and end-to-end 
location privacy protection system. First, a prototype built with full location capturing capability 
will help improve data quality in the evaluation process. The next stage of this work is to 
incorporate deception preferences into a privacy preference model for location-based applications 
in a platform-independent environment. Since most smart phones now are Java -enabled, such a 
preference model needs to take advantage of this to leverage the flexibility that comes with object-
oriented programming. By encapsulating privacy preferences in a mobile agent (Yamada & 
Kamioka, 2005, and Adam, K et al, 2005), privacy preference negotiations can easily be done to 
preserve individual privacy settings of people within a social network, while disclosing just the 
amount of location information required by each requestor. 
 
A challenging issue is to examine how the deliberate withholding of location information can be 
effective in a dynamically changing context. This is particularly useful in situations where 
disclosure preferences have been set for each contact person for particular contexts. If contexts 
change frequently (such as every hour), a key challenge will be to determine when to withhold 
location information and when to disclose a true location based on a rapidly changing context. 
 
The DPC model is not context-dependent in terms of location, activity and time. It is only based on 
location as an assumption of activity. For instance, it pre-supposes that being in a gift shop means 
one is intending to buy a gift. The person could be seeing or meeting a friend at the shop, or doing 
something else other than buying a gift.  
 
An interesting research problem is to study the accuracy of context inference from location 
information. Context in this case should mean an encapsulation of location, time, and activity. 
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In conclusion, I plan to implement the new DPC model (taking into account the outcome of the 
usability study) on different mobile phone platforms and repeat the field-based study on a large 
scale. This will help minimize any biases or threats to validity in the first study. It will also be 
interesting to find out if the fact that participants knew that they were involved in a study may have 
influenced the outcome. Using real life data will help boost the validity of the DPC model. 
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Appendix A 
This section illustrates a description of the online scenario-based study outlined in Chapter 3. The 
study was administered using the Open University’s ELSA (https://elsa.open.ac.uk) system. 
STUDY ON LOCATION DISCLOSURE 
We are conducting research into the use of various techniques to control privacy as it relates to 
your mobile phone. In particular we are interested in how people can control the disclosure of their 
location and the ways in which they might need to provide false or imprecise information. The aim 
of this work is to ensure that the technology empowers people instead of removing their privacy. 
We would be grateful if you completed this questionnaire to aid in our research. It should take 
between 5 and 10 minutes to complete and all answers will remain strictly confidential.  
BACKGROUND 
As you may be aware, if you carry an ordinary mobile telephone it is possible for your mobile 
telephone network to track your location with an accuracy of between 100 m and 1000 m within 
most urban areas, although this accuracy is set to increase soon. You may also subscribe to services 
which will let others see your location. You might be able to imagine some of the benefits of this 
kind of service, such as:  
1. Safety - families, friends and loved ones are able to keep track of each other (especially 
keeping track of kids while they are away from their parents) or you can be located in case 
of an emergency.  
2. Location Based Services – getting directions to the nearest bank machine, tourist 
information about the site you are standing in front of, and so on.  
3. Improved efficiency - businesses (e.g. Taxi services, sales reps) use location-tracking 
systems to find out who is closer to a client.  
Possible limitations in the use of these systems are:  
1. Loss of privacy, feeling of being constantly under surveillance.  
2. Profiling as a result of inference of activity from one’s location, location based spam 
(getting text messages from a shop as you pass it).  
3. Lack of control of what location to disclose to whom and at what time (in most cases only 
consent is sought from the data subject).  
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Imagine you and people in your social network have a location-tracking system (on your mobile 
phones) which may permit you to keep track of each other’s location. People within your social 
network will typically include (but not limited to) friends, spouse/partner, colleagues, boss, and 
family. Imagine you are able to manipulate and control what location to reveal to whom, and at 
what time. Further imagine that you are able to disclose a location different from your true location 
using a privacy control feature that comes with the location tracking service. This gives you the 
ability not only to send an untrue location, but also to make the disclosed location look plausible 
enough for the requestor. In the following questions, please assume that your mobile phone is 
capable of handling all the above functions.  
  begin questionnaire>>
 
  
     
 
Electronic Surveying at the Open University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
General Disclosure 
In general, and in circumstances where it would in no way be embarrassing to reveal your location to the person, how do you  
think you would disclose your location/activity to the following people?  
Note: Your responses will only be recorded or saved once you click the submit button. Therefore you can choose to opt out of the  
study at anytime. 
always provide exact location  
give false location information  
vary the precision of location information 
  
spouse/partner 
ignore request  
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Other (please specify)  
 
always provide exact location  
give false location information  
vary the precision of location information 
ignore request  
Other (please specify)  
  
Colleague  
 
always provide exact location  
give false location information  
vary the precision of location information 
ignore request  
Other (please specify)  
  
Boss  
 
always provide exact location  
give false location information  
vary the precision of location information 
ignore request  
Other (please specify)  
  
Parent (i.e. if you are under 18)  
 
always provide exact location  
give false location information  
vary the precision of location information 
ignore request  
Other (please specify)  
  
Friend 
 
always provide exact location  
  
Child  
give false location information  
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vary the precision of location information 
ignore request  
Other (please specify)  
 
always provide exact location  
give false location information  
vary the precision of location information 
ignore request  
Other (please specify)  
  
Another member of the family  
 
always provide exact location  
give false location information  
vary the precision of location information 
ignore request  
Other (please specify)  
  
Stranger 
 
  << previous page
 
next page >>   
  
 
 
The use of deception in social mobile computing  
For each of the questions below, we want you to imagine yourself in that circumstance in which you are asked to disclose your 
location, but might not wish to do so. For each person who might ask you in this type of situation, please score how likely you 
would be to provide false information using your mobile phone, and how comfortable you would be deceiving this person in this 
situation.  
 
SECTION A: Disclosing an untrue location with good intention 
• For instance, you are in a gift shop about to buy a surprise gift for a person. You set your phone to reveal a different 
but plausible location to that person when they ask for your location.  
Very likely 2  3 4 Not at all Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this deception if the 
person was your spouse/partner? 
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Very 
Comfortable  
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel deceiving your 
spouse/partner in this circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 Not at all Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this deception if the 
person was your boss? 
     
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel deceiving your boss in 
this circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 Not at all Likely  Please answer this (and the next) only if you are under 18 
years of age.  
How likely would you be to engage in this deception if the 
person was your parent? 
     
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel deceiving your parent in 
this circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 Not at all Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this deception if the 
person was your work colleague? 
     
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel deceiving your work 
colleague in this circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 Not at all Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this deception if the 
person was your friend? 
     
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  How comfortable would you feel deceiving your friend in 
this circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 Not at all Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this deception if the 
person was your child? 
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Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel deceiving your child in 
this circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 Not at all Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this deception if the 
person was another member of your family 
     
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  How comfortable would you feel deceiving another 
member of your family in this circumstance? 
     
Please use the space below to provide any comments you may have regarding the above responses, if any. 
 
  << previous page next page >>   
      
 
 
SECTION B: Disclosing an untrue location to maintain social harmony 
For Example, 
The person wants to know your location/activity while you are engaged in an activity you do not want him/her to know. 
You are running late to meet the person.You do not want him/her to know you have still not left.  
You have very little time to complete a task and you don’t want the person to know you are nearby as social convention would 
require you to talk to him/her. 
Very likely  2  3  4  
Not at all 
Likely  How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your 
spouse/partner? 
     
Very 
Comfortable  
2  3  4  
Not at all 
Comfortable  How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your spouse/partner in this 
circumstance? 
     
How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your boss? 
Very likely  2  3  4  
Not at all 
Likely  
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Very 
Comfortable  
2  3  4  
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your boss in this circumstance? 
     
Very likely  2  3  4  
Not at all 
Likely  
Please answer this (and the next) only if 
you are under 18 years of age.  
How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your parent? 
     
Very 
comfortable  
2  3  4  
Not at all 
comfortable  How comfortable would you be to engage 
in this deception if the person was your 
parent? 
     
Very likely  2  3  4  
Not at all 
Likely  How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your work 
colleague? 
     
Very 
Comfortable  
2  3  4  
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your work colleague in this 
circumstance? 
     
Very likely  2  3  4  
Not at all 
Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your friend? 
     
Very 
Comfortable  
2  3  4  
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your friend in this 
circumstance? 
     
Very likely  2  3  4  
Not at all 
Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your child? 
     
Very 
Comfortable  
2  3  4  
Not at all 
Comfortable  How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your child in this 
circumstance? 
     
How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was another 
Very likely  2  3  4  
Not at all 
Likely  
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member of your family 
     
Very 
Comfortable  
2  3  4  
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving another member of your family 
in this circumstance? 
     
Please use the space below to provide any comments you may have regarding the above responses, if any. 
 
Please use the space below to provide any comments you may have regarding the above responses, if any. 
 
  << previous page
 
next page >>   
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION C: Disclosing an untrue location in situations which can neither be classified as being of good intention or 
maintaining social harmony. 
 
For example, you are in a location or engaged in an activity you will feel embarrassed for the requestor to know.  
Very likely 2  3 4 
Not at all 
Likely  How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your 
spouse/partner? 
     
Very 
Comfortable  
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your spouse/partner in this 
circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 
Not at all 
Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your boss? 
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Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your boss? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 
Not at all 
Likely  
Please answer this (and the next) only if 
you are under 18 years of age.  
How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your parent? 
     
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your parent? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 
Not at all 
Likely  How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your work 
colleague? 
     
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your work colleague in this 
circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 
Not at all 
Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your friend? 
     
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your friend in this 
circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 
Not at all 
Likely  
How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was your child? 
     
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving your child in this 
circumstance? 
     
Very likely 2  3 4 
Not at all 
Likely  How likely would you be to engage in this 
deception if the person was another 
member of your family? 
     
How comfortable would you feel 
deceiving another member of your family 
Very 
Comfortable 
2  3 4 
Not at all 
Comfortable  
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in this circumstance? 
     
Please use the space below to provide any comments you may have regarding the above responses, if any. 
 
  << previous page
 
next page >>   
 
 
PLAUSIBLE LOCATION DISCLOSURE 
 
Disclosing one's location, whether a true disclosure or not, requires that the disclosed location makes 
sense to the requestor. For instance, if the requestor is in a different country or even in a different 
continent, a fine-grained disclosure may not be necessary. To illustrate this, responding to a location 
request from a requestor (in another country or continent) with the answer: "I'm at KMI podium" may 
not make much sense to the requestor if he/she does not know what or where KMI podium is. 
Responding with say, "I'm in Milton Keynes" may be more appropriate in this case. This may or may not 
require knowing some information about the requestor in order to disclose a location that is plausible 
enough, depending on who is disclosing the location. 
 
Based on the above, what information about the requestor will you want to know before disclosing your 
location (assuming it is possible to know such information on your mobile phone)? Please choose one. 
the approximate location of the requestor at the time of the request  
the reason for the request 
I do not wish to know any information 
Other (please specify)  
 
  << previous page
 
submit >>   
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Appendix B 
This section describes in detail the between-subjects study described in Section 3.7. 
Mobile phones and location-disclosure study 
Thank you for responding to our request for help with our survey. This study is hosted by Karim 
Adam, a PhD student at the Open University Computing Research Centre. 
As you may be aware, if you carry an ordinary mobile telephone it is possible for your mobile 
telephone network to track your location with an accuracy of between 100 m and 1000 m within 
most urban areas, although this accuracy is set to increase soon. You may also subscribe to services 
which will let others see your location. You might be able to imagine some of the benefits of this 
kind of service, such as: 
• Safety - families, friends and loved ones are able to keep track of each other (especially 
keeping track of kids while they are away from their parents) or you can be located in case 
of an emergency. 
• Location Based Services - getting directions to the nearest bank machine, tourist 
information about the site you are standing in front of, and so on.  
• Improved efficiency - businesses (e.g. Taxi services, sales reps) use location-tracking 
systems to find out who is closer to a client. 
 
Possible limitations in the use of these systems are: 
• Loss of privacy, feeling of being constantly under surveillance.  
• Profiling as a result of inference of activity from one's location, location-based spam 
(getting text messages from a shop as you pass it). 
• Lack of control of what location to disclose to whom and at what time. 
On the following page, we are going to present you with a scenario that would involve not 
disclosing your location to another via a mobile phone. We want you to imagine how you would 
feel and react in such a situation, even if you don't own a mobile phone, or wouldn't normally act in 
the way shown in the scenario.  
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If you are happy to continue please select 'Click here to begin the study' below:'  
 
Click here to begin the study 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobile Phone Location 
Please imagine that you are in a gift shop about to buy a surprise gift for a friend. As you are in the 
shop, your phone beeps. It is your friend, the intended recipient of the gift, asking where you are. You 
click on the 'do not disclose true location' response, which tells your friend that you are in a 
completely different location - at work. There is a high possibility that your friend will discover that 
you have not been entirely honest disclosing your location. 
Imagining that you were in this scenario, please answer the questions below: 
1. How comfortable would you be giving this response to their location query?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
2.  Would you see your response as a form of deception?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
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3.  How likely do you think that your response might be discovered by your friend?  
   
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
4.  Would you have an ethical problem engaging in this type of response?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
5.  If you were faced with this scenario in real life, how likely is it that you would respond in 
the same way as in the scenario?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
6. If you would like to make any further comments, please type them here: 
    
 
  
7. Finally, could you please tell us: 
Your age (years) 
Your gender:  
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Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire, 
your help is very important to us. 
If you are happy with your responses, please click the submit button below. 
Submit
 
  
If you have any difficulty using this questionnaire, please e-mail the OU's internet survey staff. 
 
Electronic Surveying at the Open University 
 
 
Mobile Phone Location 
Please imagine that you are in a gift shop about to buy a surprise gift for a friend. As you are in the 
shop, your phone beeps. It is your friend, the intended recipient of the gift, asking where you are. You 
click on the 'be ambiguous' response, which only tells your friend that you are in the town centre, not 
in the specific gift shop. There is a high possibility that your friend will discover that you have not 
been entirely honest disclosing your location. 
Imagining that you were in this scenario, please answer the questions below: 
1. How comfortable would you be giving this response to their location query?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
2.  Would you see your response as a form of deception?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
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3.  How likely do you think that your response might be discovered by your friend?  
   
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
4.  Would you have an ethical problem engaging in this type of response?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
5.  If you were faced with this scenario in real life, how likely is it that you would respond in 
the same way as in the scenario?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
6. If you would like to make any further comments, please type them here: 
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7. Finally, could you please tell us: 
Your age (years) 
Your gender:  
  
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire, 
your help is very important to us. 
If you are happy with your responses, please click the submit button below. 
Submit
 
  
If you have any difficulty using this questionnaire, please e-mail the OU's internet survey staff. 
 
Electronic Surveying at the Open University 
 
 
Mobile Phone Location 
Please imagine that you are in a gift shop about to buy a surprise gift for a friend. As you are in the 
shop, your phone beeps. It is your friend, the intended recipient of the gift, asking where you are. You 
click on the 'be ambiguous' response, which only tells your friend that you are in the town centre, not 
in the specific gift shop. There is very little possibility that your friend will discover that you have 
not been entirely honest disclosing your location. 
Imagining that you were in this scenario, please answer the questions below: 
1. How comfortable would you be giving this response to their location query?  
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Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
2.  Would you see your response as a form of deception?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
3.  How likely do you think that your response might be discovered by your friend?  
   
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
4.  Would you have an ethical problem engaging in this type of response?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
5.  If you were faced with this scenario in real life, how likely is it that you would respond in 
the same way as in the scenario?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
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6. If you would like to make any further comments, please type them here: 
    
 
  
7. Finally, could you please tell us: 
Your age (years) 
Your gender:  
  
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire, 
your help is very important to us. 
If you are happy with your responses, please click the submit button below. 
Submit
 
  
If you have any difficulty using this questionnaire, please e-mail the OU's internet survey staff. 
 
Electronic Surveying at the Open University 
 
Mobile Phone Location 
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Please imagine that you are in a gift shop about to buy a surprise gift for a friend. As you are in the 
shop, your phone beeps. It is your friend, the intended recipient of the gift, asking where you are. You 
click on the 'do not disclose true location' response, which tells your friend that you are in a 
completely different location - at work. There is very little possibility that your friend will discover 
that you have not been entirely honest disclosing your location. 
Imagining that you were in this scenario, please answer the questions below: 
1. How comfortable would you be giving this response to their location query?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
2.  Would you see your response as a form of deception?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
3.  How likely do you think that your response might be discovered by your friend?  
   
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
4.  Would you have an ethical problem engaging in this type of response?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
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5.  If you were faced with this scenario in real life, how likely is it that you would respond in 
the same way as in the scenario?  
     
Very much    Not at all 
     
 
 
  
6. If you would like to make any further comments, please type them here: 
    
 
  
7. Finally, could you please tell us: 
Your age (years) 
Your gender:  
  
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire, 
your help is very important to us. 
If you are happy with your responses, please click the submit button below. 
Submit
 
  
If you have any difficulty using this questionnaire, please e-mail the OU's internet survey staff. 
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Appendix C 
This is processed data captured from the between-the-subject study in Appendix B using the statistical tool 
SPSS. 
 
Chi Square Test Results 
 
Possibility of discovery versus level of discomfort crosstabulation 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
Possibility of 
discovery 
High possibility of 
discovery 
64 60 37 60 46 267 
 
Low possibility of 
discovery 
85 58 36 28 29 236 
Total  149 118 73 88 75 
503 
 
Chi-Square Tests for possibility of discovery versus level of discomfort crosstabulation 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.650
a
 4 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 16.900 4 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 
13.192 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
503 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 34.25. 
 
 
 
Technique used to protect privacy versus level of discomfort Crosstabulation 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
Techninque used to 
protect privacy 
Deception 
65 52 38 53 55 263 
 
Blurring 84 66 35 35 20 240 
Total  149 118 73 88 75 
503 
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Chi-Square Tests for technique used to protect privacy versus level of 
discomfort crosstabulation  
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.219
a
 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 23.858 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
21.123 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 503 
  
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
34.83. 
 
 
Level of ethics concern versus technique used to protect privacy 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
Deception 
54 58 36 38 77 263 
Technique used to 
protect privacy 
Blurring 15 37 25 46 114 237 
Total  69 95 61 84 191 
500 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of ethics concern versus technique used to protect privacy 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.342
a
 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 36.698 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 
33.609 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 500 
  
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
28.91. 
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Level of ethics concern versus possibility of discovery crosstab 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Possibility of 
discovery 
High possibility of 
discovery 
38 57 29 41 100 265 
 
Low possibility of 
discovery 
31 38 32 43 91 235 
Total  69 95 61 84 191 
500 
 
Chi-Square Tests for Level of ethics concern versus possibility of discovery crosstab 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.341
a
 4 .502 
Likelihood Ratio 3.355 4 .500 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.866 1 .352 
N of Valid Cases 500 
  
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.67. 
 
 
Univariate Analysis of Variance 
 
Between-Subjects Factors
High
possibility
of discovery
267
Low
possibility
of discovery
236
Deception 263
Blurring 240
1.00
2.00
Possibility of
discovery
1.00
2.00
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Value Label N
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Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: q1
3.19 1.488 137
2.52 1.319 130
2.87 1.445 267
2.64 1.450 126
2.12 1.276 110
2.40 1.394 236
2.93 1.493 263
2.34 1.312 240
2.65 1.439 503
Techninque used
to protect privacyDeception
Blurring
Total
Deception
Blurring
Total
Deception
Blurring
Total
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Total
Mean Std. Deviation N
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Possibility of discovery
Dependent Variable: q1
2.856 .085 2.689 3.024
2.381 .091 2.202 2.559
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
2. Techninque used to protect privacy
Dependent Variable: q1
2.916 .086 2.748 3.085
2.321 .090 2.144 2.498
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
3. Possibility of discovery * Techninque used to protect privacy
Dependent Variable: q1
3.190 .119 2.956 3.423
2.523 .122 2.283 2.763
2.643 .124 2.399 2.886
2.118 .133 1.858 2.379
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Deception
Blurring
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
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Univariate Analysis of Variance 
 
Between-Subjects Factors
High
possibility
of discovery
267
Low
possibility
of discovery
236
Deception 263
Blurring 240
1.00
2.00
Possibility of
discovery
1.00
2.00
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Value Label N
 
 
Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: q2
2.32 1.339 137
3.70 1.316 130
2.99 1.494 267
2.65 1.450 126
3.80 1.333 110
3.19 1.507 236
2.48 1.400 263
3.75 1.322 240
3.08 1.502 503
Techninque used
to protect privacyDeception
Blurring
Total
Deception
Blurring
Total
Deception
Blurring
Total
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Total
Mean Std. Deviation N
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: q2
209.090a 3 69.697 37.663 .000
4858.048 1 4858.048 2625.251 .000
5.765 1 5.765 3.115 .078
199.600 1 199.600 107.862 .000
1.647 1 1.647 .890 .346
923.404 499 1.851
5915.000 503
1132.493 502
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
discover
techniqu
discover * techniqu
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .185 (Adjusted R Squared = .180)a. 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Possibility of discovery
Dependent Variable: q2
3.011 .083 2.847 3.174
3.225 .089 3.051 3.400
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
2. Techninque used to protect privacy
Dependent Variable: q2
2.486 .084 2.321 2.651
3.750 .088 3.577 3.923
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
3. Possibility of discovery * Techninque used to protect privacy
Dependent Variable: q2
2.321 .116 2.093 2.550
3.700 .119 3.466 3.934
2.651 .121 2.413 2.889
3.800 .130 3.545 4.055
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Deception
Blurring
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
 
Univariate Analysis of Variance 
 
Between-Subjects Factors
High
possibility
of discovery
266
Low
possibility
of discovery
235
Deception 262
Blurring 239
1.00
2.00
Possibility of
discovery
1.00
2.00
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Value Label N
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Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: q3
2.83 1.119 136
2.73 1.048 130
2.78 1.084 266
3.38 1.080 126
3.48 1.077 109
3.43 1.077 235
3.10 1.132 262
3.07 1.122 239
3.08 1.126 501
Techninque used
to protect privacyDeception
Blurring
Total
Deception
Blurring
Total
Deception
Blurring
Total
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Total
Mean Std. Deviation N
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: q3
52.885a 3 17.628 15.064 .000
4796.860 1 4796.860 4099.146 .000
52.263 1 52.263 44.661 .000
.000 1 .000 .000 .984
1.197 1 1.197 1.023 .312
581.594 497 1.170
5399.000 501
634.479 500
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
discover
techniqu
discover * techniqu
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .083 (Adjusted R Squared = .078)a. 
 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Possibility of discovery
Dependent Variable: q3
2.781 .066 2.650 2.911
3.429 .071 3.290 3.568
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
2. Techninque used to protect privacy
Dependent Variable: q3
3.106 .067 2.975 3.237
3.104 .070 2.966 3.242
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
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3. Possibility of discovery * Techninque used to protect privacy
Dependent Variable: q3
2.831 .093 2.649 3.013
2.731 .095 2.544 2.917
3.381 .096 3.192 3.570
3.477 .104 3.273 3.681
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Deception
Blurring
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
 
Univariate Analysis of Variance 
 
Between-Subjects Factors
Deception 263
Blurring 237
High
possibility
of discovery
265
Low
possibility
of discovery
235
1.00
2.00
Techninque used
to protect privacy
1.00
2.00
Possibility of
discovery
Value Label N
 
 
Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: q4
2.97 1.557 137
3.24 1.504 126
3.10 1.535 263
3.88 1.322 128
3.87 1.348 109
3.87 1.331 237
3.41 1.515 265
3.53 1.465 235
3.47 1.492 500
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Total
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Total
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Total
Techninque used
to protect privacyDeception
Blurring
Total
Mean Std. Deviation N
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: q4
6044.046 1 6044.046 82.498 .071
72.902 .995 73.263a
73.377 1 73.377 32.258 .111
2.275 1 2.275b
2.161 1 2.161 .950 .508
2.275 1 2.275b
2.275 1 2.275 1.094 .296
1030.942 496 2.079c
Source
Hypothesis
Error
Intercept
Hypothesis
Error
techniqu
Hypothesis
Error
discover
Hypothesis
Error
techniqu *
discover
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
 MS(techniqu) +  MS(discover) -  MS(techniqu * discover)a. 
 MS(techniqu * discover)b. 
 MS(Error)c. 
 
 
Expected Mean Squaresa,b
248.273 248.273 124.137 1.000 Intercept
248.273 .000 124.137 1.000
.000 248.273 124.137 1.000
.000 .000 124.137 1.000
.000 .000 .000 1.000
Source
Intercept
techniqu
discover
techniqu * discover
Error
Var(techniqu) Var(discover)
Var(techniqu *
discover) Var(Error)
Quadratic
Term
Variance Component
For each source, the expected mean square equals the sum of the coefficients in the cells
times the variance components, plus a quadratic term involving effects in the Quadratic
Term cell.
a. 
Expected Mean Squares are based on the Type III Sums of Squares.b. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Techninque used to protect privacy * Possibility of discovery
Dependent Variable: q4
2.971 .123 2.729 3.213
3.238 .128 2.986 3.490
3.875 .127 3.625 4.125
3.872 .138 3.600 4.143
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
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2. Possibility of discovery
Dependent Variable: q4
3.423 .089 3.249 3.597
3.555 .094 3.370 3.740
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
3. Techninque used to protect privacy
Dependent Variable: q4
3.104 .089 2.930 3.279
3.873 .094 3.689 4.058
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
 
Univariate Analysis of Variance 
 
Between-Subjects Factors
Deception 261
Blurring 239
High
possibility
of discovery
266
Low
possibility
of discovery
234
1.00
2.00
Techninque used
to protect privacy
1.00
2.00
Possibility of
discovery
Value Label N
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Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: q5
2.90 1.541 136
2.74 1.577 125
2.82 1.557 261
2.28 1.353 130
1.91 1.259 109
2.11 1.321 239
2.59 1.482 266
2.35 1.493 234
2.48 1.491 500
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Total
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Total
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Total
Techninque used
to protect privacyDeception
Blurring
Total
Mean Std. Deviation N
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: q5
2991.903 1 2991.903 41.304 .069
88.162 1.217 72.436a
65.065 1 65.065 48.638 .091
1.338 1 1.338b
8.709 1 8.709 6.511 .238
1.338 1 1.338b
1.338 1 1.338 .640 .424
1035.960 496 2.089c
Source
Hypothesis
Error
Intercept
Hypothesis
Error
techniqu
Hypothesis
Error
discover
Hypothesis
Error
techniqu *
discover
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
 MS(techniqu) +  MS(discover) -  MS(techniqu * discover)a. 
 MS(techniqu * discover)b. 
 MS(Error)c. 
 
 
Expected Mean Squaresa,b
248.296 248.296 124.148 1.000 Intercept
248.296 .000 124.148 1.000
.000 248.296 124.148 1.000
.000 .000 124.148 1.000
.000 .000 .000 1.000
Source
Intercept
techniqu
discover
techniqu * discover
Error
Var(techniqu) Var(discover)
Var(techniqu *
discover) Var(Error)
Quadratic
Term
Variance Component
For each source, the expected mean square equals the sum of the coefficients in the cells
times the variance components, plus a quadratic term involving effects in the Quadratic
Term cell.
a. 
Expected Mean Squares are based on the Type III Sums of Squares.b. 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
 
1. Techninque used to protect privacy * Possibility of discovery
Dependent Variable: q5
2.897 .124 2.654 3.141
2.736 .129 2.482 2.990
2.277 .127 2.028 2.526
1.908 .138 1.636 2.180
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
2. Possibility of discovery
Dependent Variable: q5
2.587 .089 2.413 2.761
2.322 .095 2.136 2.508
Possibility of discovery
High possibility of
discovery
Low possibility of
discovery
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
 
 
3. Techninque used to protect privacy
Dependent Variable: q5
2.817 .090 2.641 2.992
2.093 .094 1.908 2.277
Techninque used
to protect privacy
Deception
Blurring
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
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Appendix D: Post User Study Responses 
This section provides data captured in the post user study. They are responses provided by 
participants after every request/disclosure was made during the entire duration of the study. 
Participant Date Objective of 
Disclosure 
Post-disclosure question Response 
Requestor 1 21/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at home today at 
8am?  
True  
 21/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 8:05am?  
Very true 
 22/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home watching 
TV today at 8:15am?  
Fairly true 
 22/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 11am?  
Very true 
 23/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Tesco doing 
some shopping today at 
2pm?  
Fairly true 
 23/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the gym today at 
5pm?  
True 
 24/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at Bletchley today 
at 11am?  
Very true 
 24/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was shopping at 
Bletchley today at 11am? 
Fairly true 
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 25/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at home today 
doing the dishes at 8am? 
Very true 
 25/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 9am?  
 
Very true 
 26/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Walton Hall 
today at 9am?  
True 
 26/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home today at 
8:15am?  
Very true 
 26/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was window shopping 
at Kingston today at 
11am?  
Fairly true 
 26/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Tesco doing 
some shopping today at 
2pm?  
Very true 
 27/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Kingston today 
at 5pm?  
Very true 
 27/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home today at 
11am?  
True 
 27/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at Bletchley today 
at 2:15pm? 
Very true 
 27/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was playing football at 
Walton Hall today at 
Fairly true 
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11:15am? 
 28/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was watching TV at 
home today at 8:00am? 
Very true 
 28/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Bletchley today 
at 8:15am? 
Very true 
 29/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at home today at 
8am?  
True  
 29/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 8:05am?  
Very true 
 30/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home watching 
TV today at 8:15am?  
Fairly true 
 30/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 11am?  
Very true 
 31/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Tesco doing 
some shopping today at 
2pm?  
Very true 
 31/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the gym today at 
5pm?  
True 
 01/06/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at Bletchley today 
at 11am?  
Very true 
 01/06/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was shopping at 
Bletchley today at 11am? 
Fairly true 
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 02/06/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at home today 
doing the dishes at 8am? 
Very true 
 02/06/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 9am?  
 
Very true 
 02/06/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Walton Hall 
today at 9am?  
True 
 02/06/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home today at 
8:15am?  
Very true 
 03/06/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was window shopping 
at Kingston today at 
11am?  
Fairly true 
 03/06/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Tesco doing 
some shopping today at 
2pm?  
Very true 
 03/06/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Kingston today 
at 5pm?  
Very true 
Requestor 2 21/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at home today at 
8am?  
Very true 
 21/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 8:05am?  
Very true 
 22/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home watching 
TV today at 8:15am?  
Fairly true 
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 22/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 11am?  
Very true 
 23/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Tesco doing 
some shopping today at 
2pm?  
Very true 
 23/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the gym today at 
5pm?  
True 
 24/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at Bletchley today 
at 11am?  
Very true 
 24/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was shopping at 
Bletchley today at 11am? 
Fairly true 
 25/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at home today 
doing the dishes at 8am? 
Very true 
 25/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 9am?  
 
Very true 
 26/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Walton Hall 
today at 9am?  
True 
 26/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home today at 
8:15am?  
Very true 
 26/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was window shopping 
Fairly true 
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at Kingston today at 
11am?  
 26/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Tesco doing 
some shopping today at 
2pm?  
True 
 27/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Kingston today 
at 5pm?  
Very true 
 27/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home today at 
11am?  
True 
 27/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at Bletchley today 
at 2:15pm? 
Very true 
 27/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was playing football at 
Walton Hall today at 
11:15am? 
True  
 28/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was watching TV at 
home today at 8:00am? 
True  
 28/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Bletchley today 
at 8:15am? 
Very true 
 29/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at home today at 
8am?  
Very true 
 29/05/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 8:05am?  
Very true 
 30/05/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home watching 
TV today at 8:15am?  
True  
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 30/05/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 11am?  
True  
 31/05/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Tesco doing 
some shopping today at 
2pm?  
Very true 
 31/05/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the gym today at 
5pm?  
True 
 01/06/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at Bletchley today 
at 11am?  
True  
 01/06/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was shopping at 
Bletchley today at 11am? 
True 
 02/06/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at home today 
doing the dishes at 8am? 
True 
 02/06/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at the City Centre 
today at 9am?  
 
Very true 
 02/06/2007 True Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Walton Hall 
today at 9am?  
True 
 02/06/2007 False Location 
 
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was at home today at 
8:15am?  
True 
 03/06/2007 False Location plus 
Activity  
How true was the response 
from Adam when he said 
he was window shopping 
True  
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at Kingston today at 
11am?  
 03/06/2007 True Location plus 
Activity 
How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Tesco doing 
some shopping today at 
2pm?  
True 
 03/06/2007 Blurred Location How true was the response 
from Mark when he said 
he was at Kingston today 
at 5pm?  
Very true 
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Appendix E: User Consent and Post Study Questionnaires 
User Study Instructions for Mobile Client Evaluation 
Thank you for responding to our request for help with our evaluation. This study is hosted by 
Karim Adam, a PhD student at the Open University Computing Research Centre. 
We are conducting research into the use of various techniques to control privacy as it relates to 
your mobile phone. In particular we are interested in how people can control the disclosure of their 
location and the ways in which they might need to provide false or imprecise information.  
 
We have built the Mobile Client application to help people better manage their location 
information. Throughout the two week period that you will be assisting us in this study, you will be 
provided with phones which have Mobile Client installed on them.  
You can use your own SIM card in the new phones provided. In addition, you will be given free 
airtime credits for the duration of the study.  
A demonstration of the functionality of the application will be made to you once you sign the 
consent forms provided. These include making a request, a disclosure, setting disclosure 
preferences, and adding contacts. 
Each day, you will be sent an alert as to what task to carry out that day. Do not let your friend 
know what instructions you have been given for your task of the day. 
 
Should you have any queries relating to this study, contact Karim Adam on 07944691540 or 
k.a.adam@open.ac.uk.  
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Mobile Feedback Task Alerts 
 
The following are alerts that were sent out to disclosers as specific instructions for the various 
strategies employed in response to a location request. 
  
Run Mobile Client Alert: 
 
1. This is a reminder: Could you please start Mobile Client if it's not already running? Thanks 
for your attention. 
 
Disclosure Strategy Alerts: 
  
• Your task today is to disclose your true location AND an activity. e.g. "home, doing the 
dishes" 
 
• Your task today is to disclose your true location, e.g. "Refectory, Open University" 
 
• Your task today is to disclose an untrue location AND include an activity. e.g. instead of 
"office", say "home, watching TV" 
 
• Your task today is to disclose an explicitly untrue location, e.g. instead of "Tesco" say 
"Asda" 
 
• Your task today is to blur your disclosed location or make it less specific, e.g. instead of 
"Office", say "Milton Keynes" 
 
3. Please select the disclosure preference you set today? 
 
• blur my loc 
• false loc 
• false loc + activity 
• true loc 
• true loc + activity 
 
4. How true did u find the disclosed location in today's task? 
 
• very true 
• true 
• fairly true 
• not true 
• can't tell 
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Post Study Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for successfully taking part in the evaluation of the Mobile Client application. Please 
take your time to provide your input to the following questionnaire.  
 
GENERIC QUESTIONS (TO ALL PARTICIPANTS) 
1. Did you encounter any problems during the two week evaluation period? If yes, please 
state the nature of the problem in the space provided below: 
………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………… 
2. If you answered yes above, please suggest (if any) how you would have liked the Mobile 
Client application to function in order to prevent the problem from occurring. 
………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………… 
3. If your phone had the Mobile Client application with the same capability of helping you 
manage the amount of location information disclosed to your friends, how useful do you 
think it would be in protecting your location privacy? Please circle or mark as appropriate. 
a. Very useful 
b. Useful 
c. Somewhat useful 
d. Not at all useful 
e. Cannot tell 
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Investigating location privacy in mobile devices 
Informed Consent Form 
All of the information obtained from your participation will be kept confidential. Your 
consent form will be kept separate from the data and the data will not be available to 
anyone other than the experimenters conducting the study. 
 You are reminded that your participation is voluntary. This means that you can choose to 
stop at any time without penalty. 
If you have any questions or concerns related to your participation in this study, please call 
Karim Adam, Department of Computing on 07944691540 or k.a.adam@open.ac.uk.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
"I have read the information about the study and have been informed of its general 
purpose. I am fully aware of the risks and benefits associated with participating in the 
study described to me. I acknowledge that I have received a copy of the informed consent 
form and agree to participate in the study. I understand that I can withdraw at any time 
without penalty." 
  
______________________                                    _________________ 
Print name                                                                Today's Date         
  
_________________________ 
Signature 
  
______________ 
ID#                                         
  
